RACIAL PROFILING

A NEW CHALLENGE IN PUBLIC POLICY

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PUBLIC POLICY CONCENTRATION THESIS

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"You look like this sketch of someone who's thinking about committing a crime."
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Dan Korobkin
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1. **INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE ISSUE**

In the late 1990s, a new civil rights issue emerged in politics and across the country. Bruce Springsteen has written a hit song about it. The ACLU launched a national advertising campaign about it. Dozens of celebrities have complained they were victimized by it. Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Bill Bradley, and even George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and John Ashcroft have all publicly expressed their concern over it.

What is it? It's called racial profiling.

In this paper, I examine racial profiling as a new challenge in public policy. In this introductory chapter, I hope to define racial profiling and set up a framework for

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further examination of this issue as a matter of public policy. In Chapter 2, I will review some of the events and trends that placed racial profiling on the public agenda. Chapter 3 will be a theoretical discussion of the costs and benefits of racial profiling as a public policy or public practice. I will analyze the relevant policy itself in the subsequent two chapters: policy-making by the judiciary in Chapter 4 and by legislatures in Chapter 5. Finally, a brief epilogue will address the effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks on this issue.

It is appropriate to begin with definition. In general terms, racial profiling is the discriminatory treatment of minorities by law enforcement officials based on the belief that skin color is a predictor of criminal activity. That is, the profile of a "typical" criminal may include race, and a police officer may be instructed, or may choose, to target her activities against persons who roughly match that profile – even persons who do not match the individualized description of a wanted suspect. Though it is normally considered appropriate to allow police officers some discretion in scrutinizing "suspicious" individuals, the question of whether their profiling criteria may include race is a good deal more controversial.

In practice, racial profiling can take a number of forms – in scope and severity. In scope, racial profiling can be and is practiced in different kinds of places, against

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5 A number of definitions have been suggested. See Russell, supra note 3, for a useful discussion on how to define racial profiling. See also Randall Kennedy, "Suspect Policy," The New Republic 13-20 Sept. 1999 at 35: "Racial profiling occurs whenever police routinely use race as a negative signal that, along with an accumulation of other signals, causes an officer to react with suspicion."

different kinds of people, and by different kinds of authorities. For example, it is not considered uncommon for private security guards in shopping malls to follow African-American youths because they believe that demographic is most likely to engage in shoplifting. Recent public attention, though, has focused on racial profiling as it is practiced on streets and highways, against African Americans and Latinos (primarily young black men), and by state and local police officers. Indeed, for the purposes of this paper I will limit discussion to that scope.

I have decided to focus on that relatively narrow scope of racial profiling for several reasons. First, it involves “state action” – any activity by the government that is directly or indirectly a result of public policies or practices. Since this paper is a public policy thesis, state action seems most appropriate. Second, the events and trends that placed racial profiling on the public agenda also fall within that scope. Finally, most of the public policy pertaining to racial profiling, both judicial doctrine and legislation, falls roughly within that scope as well.

7 See Reginald T. Shuford, Any Way You Slice It: Why Racial Profiling Is Wrong 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 371 (1999). Extending racial profiling’s nickname, “Driving While Black,” itself a pun on the real crime of Driving While Intoxicated, Shuford lists a number of situations in which racial profiling can occur: “Racial profiling happens to consumers and pedestrians, on planes, trains, and automobiles. There is driving while black (or brown), flying while black, walking while black, shopping while black, hailing (as in a cab) while black, swimming while black …and dining while black …to name a few. The most accurate term to describe the pervasiveness of the phenomenon is breathing while black, a reality underscored by the shooting deaths over a thirteen-month period - by the New York Police Department alone - of four unarmed black men, A madou Diallo, Patrick Dorismond, Malcolm Ferguson and Richard Watson.” See also Kenneth Meeks, Driving While Black: Highways, Shopping Malls, Taxicabs, Sidewalks (New York: Broadway, 2000). Meeks’s variants on the phrase include Riding the Train While Black, Shopping While Black, Flying While Black and Living While Black.

8 One partial exception might be the epilogue, in which I offer some comments on racial profiling in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

9 See infra notes 21-68 and accompanying text.

10 See infra notes 109-228 and accompanying text.
Now that the scope has been settled, let us move on to severity. In severity, racial profiling can also vary widely. In fact, I propose to identify severity of racial profiling in two different forms: severity with respect to action, and severity with respect to motive. (See Figure 1.) The motive/action distinction is important, for if the term “racial profiling” is to be interpreted literally, then a police officer’s action is generally the effect of the profiling while her motive is generally what compels the profiling.

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Figure 1. Racial Profiling: Motives and Actions

First consider severity of action. The most egregious racial profiling actions involve violence, such as the Rodney King beating or the Amadou Diallo shooting.\(^\text{11}\) Short of violent behavior, police action can entail a thorough drug search of a

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motorist’s car, a time-consuming and usually humiliating procedure. Less severe though hardly innocuous acts include ticketing, abnormally rude behavior, and unprovoked harassment stops by police officers.

The motives behind racial profiling can also be described in terms of severity. Some of the most severe incidents are motivated by discriminatory intent; in some cases a police officer practically concedes to a driver that a traffic stop is solely racially motivated. Another severe manifestation of racial profiling is an institutional, police department policy - in the form of explicit instructions or officer training - that minorities should be treated differently from whites. Less severe cases include profiling based partly but not wholly on race, using a real but minor traffic violation

\[12\] Many racial profiling anecdotes include racially motivated police searches. Among the most horrific is that of U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Rossano V. Gerald: “During the second stop, which lasted two-and-a-half hours, the troopers terrorized SFC Gerald’s 12-year-old son with a police dog, placed both father and son in a closed car with the air conditioning off and fans blowing hot air, and warned that the dog would attack if they attempted to escape.” American Civil Liberties Union, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways [hereafter ACLU Report] (June 1999): 1, online at <http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html>. The ACLU Report contains a number of other anecdotes detailing less severe actions and motives in racial profiling. For anecdotes, see also American Civil Liberties Union, “Driving While Black Horror Stories,” online at <http://www.aclu.org/congress/dwbstories.html>; and Richard Morin and Michael H. Cottman, “Discrimination’s Lingering Sting,” The Washington Post 22 June 2001: A1.


\[16\] In Volusia County, Florida, an officer was being tape recorded when he pulled over a white driver. The officer “asked the man how he was doing. The driver replied, ‘Not very good,’ to which [the officer] countered, ‘Could be worse. Could be black.’” Sean P. Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combating Racial Profiling 50 Duke L.J. 331, 337-38.


\[18\] United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997).
as a pretext for a race-based stop, and “unconscious” racial profiling by police officers who are not fully aware of their racial prejudices.

Recall that motives can give rise to racial profiling, which in turn lead to police actions. It is important to note, however, that the point of thinking in terms of severity of motive and severity of action is not to assign each motive and each action to its own unique place on some severity continuum; this would be an arbitrary and pointless exercise. Rather, it helps clarify three important points about racial profiling. First, there exists a motive/action distinction that should be recognized. Second, some motives and actions are more or less severe than others. And third, there is no necessary relationship between particular motives and particular actions: non-severe motives can lead to severe actions, and vice-versa.

In summary, racial profiling, the police practice of singling out minorities for different treatment based on the belief that skin color predicts criminal activity, exists in many forms. The focus of this paper will be limited to the scope in which police officers on streets and highways target minorities, mostly young black males, based on skin color rather than individualized suspicion. Furthermore, racial profiling can be identified in terms of severity of action as well as severity of motive.

It will be best to keep these and other possible forms of racial profiling in mind when various policy-based responses to the racial profiling issue are considered, for policy-makers may wish specifically to target certain scopes, motives or actions. For

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19 See generally David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544 (1997).
now, though, this extended definition of racial profiling, including scope and severity, should prove useful in examining major developments in this issue - including important events, statistical evidence and political thought - over the last several years.

2. **BACKGROUND: RACIAL PROFILING GOES PUBLIC**

Due to the convergence of noteworthy events, compelling studies and interest group advocacy, the issue of racial profiling has, in just the last few years, become a major topic in American political discourse. As we shall see, it took some of the rarest but most severe forms of racial profiling to focus public attention on less severe but much more common practices in racial profiling. Singular horror stories have given rise to a public awareness of an endemic pattern.

First, let's examine the prevalence of racial profiling before that term, or its colloquial cousin “Driving While Black” (DWB), became popular in the media. In the black community, racial profiling has long been a widely recognized fact of life.\(^{21}\) Law professor Katheryn Russell, who has written several law review articles on the subject, notes that “stories of DWB are part of family lore. As a child, I heard stories about racially-motivated traffic stops.”\(^{22}\)

Indeed, blacks have been subject to disparate treatment by police officers since colonial times, in the North and the South.\(^{23}\) In the 1960s the police purposely targeted African-American civil rights activists, and the Kerner Commission warned against blacks’ distrust of police generated by race-based targeting.\(^{24}\)

Later, the War on Drugs gave rise to the official use of “profiling” criminal behavior, which slowly came to involve racial characteristics. During the 1970s the

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\(^{21}\) Trende, supra note 16 at 362.


\(^{23}\) Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment 51 V and. L. Rev. 333, 334.

\(^{24}\) Trende, supra note 16 at 334-35.
Drug Enforcement Agency began issuing “drug courier profiles,” which listed a host of non-racial factors that police should look for in drug interdiction activities. But in 1986, the DEA began Operation Pipeline, which specifically trained police officers to engage in “pretext stops” – using a minor traffic violation as a pretext for pulling over and searching motorists who fit the drug courier profile. The profiles issued by the DEA as part of Operation Pipeline included skin color, national origin, and race-related cultural characteristics such as dreadlocks, air fresheners, and tinted windows. As recently as 1998, the DEA office in Newark, New Jersey issued a “Heroin Trends” report which said: “Predominant wholesale traffickers are Colombian, followed by Dominicans, Chinese, West African/Nigerian, Pakistani, Hispanic and Indian. Midlevels are dominated by Dominicans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, African-Americans and Nigerians.” While the DEA claims that it never explicitly advocated the use of race as a proxy for criminal suspicion in drug interdiction efforts, their “drug courier profiles” and intelligence reports unambiguously imply a correlation between race and criminal activity.

Furthermore, litigation in New Jersey and Maryland in the early 1990s led to statistical studies indicating a racial profiling pattern in those states. In a study

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25 ACLU Report, supra note 12.
26 Id.
27 Trende, supra note 16 at 334-36.
29 Id.
30 The litigation and studies in both those states led to federal supervision from the Department of Justice. At least eight police agencies (state and local) across the country are now required to collect traffic stop data as a result of federal supervision over racial profiling, either by federal court order or by consent decree with the Justice Department. In addition, hundreds of local agencies now collect such
subsequent to Wilkins v. Maryland State Police (1996), expert witness Dr. John Lamberth determined that 72% of motorists stopped and searched along I-95 were black, even though only 18% of the cars had black drivers.\textsuperscript{31} In State v. Soto (1996), another Lamberth study revealed that 35% of motorists stopped and 73% of motorists arrested by state troopers on the New Jersey Turnpike were black, even though only 14% of the cars had black drivers.\textsuperscript{32} A judge in that case finally ruled in 1996 that New Jersey state troopers were engaged in an unconstitutional practice of racial profiling.\textsuperscript{33}

Yet despite years of anecdotal evidence, new data and a court ruling to back them up, racial profiling was not yet viewed by the American public as a significant civil rights issue. The term “racial profiling” and its variants appeared in major American newspapers in fewer than 30 articles per year through 1997. But it appeared in 90 articles in 1998, 972 articles in 1999, 2,349 articles in 2000 and 2,150 articles in the first eight months of 2001. In The New York Times alone, racial profiling was all but ignored through 1997, but it appeared in 23 articles in 1998, 268 articles in 1999, 307 articles in 2000, and 279 articles in the first eight months of 2001.\textsuperscript{34} (See Figure 2.)


\textsuperscript{34}Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe documents searches, 25 Sept. 2001 and 21 Jan. 2002. Searches were limited to the first eight months of 2001 in order to exclude discussions of racial profiling in the aftermath of the Sept. 11terrorist attacks. I deal with that element of the racial profiling debate in the epilogue.
While it is true that the very term racial profiling did not come into vogue until the late 1990s - the Oxford American Dictionary first included it in 1999\textsuperscript{35} - that nevertheless reflects the fact that Americans did not develop a vocabulary for the phenomenon until they were interested in discussing it and had identified it as a trend. General racial bias by police officers was highly publicized after the Rodney King beating and during the O.J. Simpson trial, but patterns of a systematic practice and pattern of highway stops and drug searches went relatively unacknowledged.\textsuperscript{36}

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<tr>
<th>Major Newspapers</th>
<th>The New York Times</th>
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<td>through 1997</td>
<td>fewer than 30 per year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>972</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,349</td>
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<td>1/1/01 to 8/31/01</td>
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Figure 2. Racial Profiling in the News

This changed in 1998 and 1999 when New Jersey state troopers shot and wounded three unarmed black men on the New Jersey Turnpike\textsuperscript{37} and New York City police officers fired 41 shots at Amadou Diallo, an unarmed black man in

\textsuperscript{35} Shuford, supra note 7 at 372 fn. 7.
Brooklyn, killing him. In the wake of what seemed like two instances of racial profiling gone terribly wrong, national attention began to focus on the claims of minorities and advocacy groups that police officers routinely used race as a proxy for criminal suspicion. These two serious incidents, then, have served as an impetus for new studies, media attention, public advocacy, political jockeying and legislation.

In New Jersey, the shooting gave rise in 1999 and 2000 to new public scrutiny of police tactics. The U.S. Department of Justice announced that it was investigating the state police over racial profiling complaints, and then-Governor Christine Todd Whitman ordered the state attorney general, Peter Verniero, to review state police practices. Verniero’s report found that non-white drivers made up 41% of those stopped and 79% of those searched. But the Justice Department said that racial profiling was an even more severe problem than Verniero’s report had indicated, and New Jersey entered a consent decree with the federal government, agreeing to an outside monitor who would oversee reform within the state police agency. The controversy was renewed the following year when declassified police records revealed that state police, and possibly Verniero himself, possessed evidence of racial profiling.

long before the 1998 shooting but had covered it up.\textsuperscript{42} The political damage suffered by some of New Jersey’s top officials – including Verniero, the state police superintendent, and the governor – is testimony to the significance of these events.\textsuperscript{43}

In New York City, a 15-month study commissioned by the state attorney general in the aftermath of the Amadou Diallo shooting revealed that police in New York, too, were engaged in racial profiling. The study found that 51% of those stopped and frisked by the NYPD and 63% of those stopped and frisked by the NYPD’s Street Crimes Unit (the unit involved in the Amadou Diallo shooting) were black, even though blacks made up only 26% of the population.\textsuperscript{44} The study even took into account heavier police presence in high-crime neighborhoods, but still found that blacks were disproportionately stopped and frisked.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{43} Colonel Carl Williams, then the state police superintendent, denied in 1999 that police were engaged in racial profiling, but publicly stated that “it is most likely a minority group that’s involved with” cocaine or marijuana, and that “if you are looking at heroin and stuff like that, your involvement there is more or less Jamaican.” Robert D. McFadden, “Whitman Dismisses State Police Chief for Race Remarks,” \textit{The New York Times} 1 March 1999: A1. Governor Whitman fired Williams for his comments, but later became the focus of attention herself after a 1996 photograph surfaced of her frisking a black man while looking back at the cameraman with a grin. Id. David Kocieniewski, “Frisking Photo Puts Whitman on Defensive,” \textit{The New York Times} 11 July 2000: B1. Verniero, too, found himself awash in controversy over the subject once he was nominated for the state supreme court, testified during his confirmation hearings that he was unaware of a racial profiling problem until 1998, and was subsequently accused of covering up evidence of racial profiling and lying during his confirmation hearings. The acting governor and the state senate called for his resignation from the state supreme court, but an impeachment motion failed and Verniero refused to step down. Iver Peterson, “Senate Votes for a Resolution Calling on Verniero to Resign,” \textit{The New York Times} 4 May 2001: B5. Laura Mansnerus, “DiFrancesco Urges Justice to Resign in Profiling Furor,” \textit{The New York Times} 6 April 2001: A1. Iver Peterson, “Verniero Impeachment Motion Turned Back in the Assembly,” \textit{The New York Times} 11 May 2001: B5.

\textsuperscript{44} Harris, \textit{When Success Breeds Attack}, supra note 32 at 256-57. Office of the New York Attorney General, \textit{The New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk Practices” (1999)}: iv-xvi, online at < http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html> . See Chapter 2 for a synopsis of the events and public reaction arising from the Diallo shooting and leading up to this study.

\textsuperscript{45} Id.
Before long, statistical evidence from all over the country was being produced and released, indicating a pattern of racial profiling in major police departments. Studies conducted in Dallas, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia all reported similar evidence of a racial profiling pattern.\footnote{Gregory M. Lipper, Recent Development: Racial Profiling 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 551, 552.}

The heightened attention over racial profiling led the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to launch a special campaign against it in June 1999.\footnote{See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Arrest the Racism: Campaign Background Information, online at <http://www.aclu.org/profiling/background/index.html>.} The new campaign included the release of a “special report” on racial profiling,\footnote{ACLU Report, supra note 12.} a toll-free number people could call to report racial profiling incidents,\footnote{The number is 1-877-6PROFILE. See ACLU, Campaign Background Information, supra note 47.} an online complaint form for the same purpose,\footnote{Driver Profiling Complaint Form, online at <http://forms.aclu.org/feedback//feedback.cfm?r=6&ia=1&ii=0>.} public service announcements to be broadcast on radio and television stations across the country,\footnote{ACLU, “In New Radio and Television PSA Campaign,” supra note 2.} provocative advertisements in Emerge Magazine, The New Yorker and The New York Times Magazine,\footnote{Patricia Winters Lauro, “The A.C.L.U. Is Taking a Provocative Madison Avenue Route to Raise Support for Its Causes,” The New York Times 30 May 2000: C10. The ads are available online at <http://www.aclu.org/graphics/guilt_ad.jpg> and <http://www.aclu.org/graphics/man_on_left.gif>.} and a Web site with educational materials, news archives, racial profiling anecdotes and an opportunity to write to public officials.\footnote{“ACLU Launches Special Web Collection on Racial Profiling and Driving While Black,” M2 Presswire 10 June 1999. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Arrest the Racism: Racial Profiling in America, online at <http://www.aclu.org/profiling>.}

The ACLU also filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of an African-American man who said he became the victim of racial profiling in Oklahoma, \footnote{Gregory M. Lipper, Recent Development: Racial Profiling 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 551, 552.}
the first of many racial profiling lawsuits for which it sought publicity. The ACLU's campaign launch received nationwide media attention, and that month racial profiling was the cover story in an issue of The New York Times Magazine and the topic of Bob Herbert's widely-read column in The New York Times. During a June 13 press conference, President Clinton declared racial profiling "morally indefensible."

One of the ACLU's goals in its campaign against racial profiling was to highlight the racial disparities that pervade the American criminal justice system and are reflected in, and perhaps partly caused by, profiling tactics by police officers. Racial profiling can operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the ACLU argued, because as long as minorities are disproportionately stopped, searched and arrested, the racial disparities in arrest and incarceration statistics such behavior creates will fuel the racial stereotypes which allow that behavior to continue. African Americans make up 12% of the population but 38% of those arrested for drug offenses, 59% of those convicted of drug offenses, and 63% of those convicted of drug trafficking. Thirty-three percent of whites who are convicted of drug offenses are sent to prison, compared to 50% of blacks. For drug offenders sentenced under state laws, the average maximum sentence

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57 Holmes, supra note 4.
length for whites is 51 months, while for blacks it is 60 months. As long as racial profiling continues, in other words, arrest and conviction records are sure both to reflect and to exacerbate these stereotypes. For this reason, an interest in ending racial profiling can be seen as inextricably linked to a more general interest in reducing inequalities in the criminal justice system and racial stereotypes in American culture.

After the New Jersey Turnpike and Amadou Diallo shootings, new public awareness was reflected in public opinion polls demonstrating that most Americans believed racial profiling was taking place and was unacceptable. In 1999, the Gallup Organization took a nation-wide poll on racial profiling in which that term was neutrally described as the practice by which “some police officers stop motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe that these groups are more likely than others to commit certain types of crimes.” Fifty-six percent of whites and 77% of blacks believed that racial profiling was widespread, and 80% of whites and 87% of blacks disapproved of the practice. Forty-two percent of blacks claimed to have been a victim of racial profiling, including 72% of young black men aged 18 to

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60 See, e.g., Russell, supra note 22.
62 Id.
Similar results were reproduced in other polls, some of which indicated that police were being perceived as less fair than ever before. Following shifts in public opinion, several law enforcement institutions also changed their views on racial profiling. Just a few years ago, most police agencies either denied that racial profiling was taking place or else sought to justify it. For example, in 1998 the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) and National Troopers Coalition publicly declared their opposition to collecting racial data on traffic stops because, according to NAPO, there was “no pressing need or justification.” Los Angeles police chief Bernard Parks, who is black, defended racial profiling in 1999 as justified by statistically rational police behavior. But by the end of 1999, such opinions were no longer acceptable in mainstream public discourse. The conservative International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), previously opposed to data collection, declared its support for data collection and opposition to racial profiling at its annual convention in November 1999. When the PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer ran a segment on racial profiling in March 2001, panelists included the police chiefs of Rochester and Minneapolis, both of whom expressed concern about

63 Id.
66 Goldberg, supra note 55.
racial profiling and supported data collection.\textsuperscript{68} Within a period of just two years, there was near-unanimous agreement among police officers, at least publicly, that racial profiling was unethical and inexcusable.

Return to the severity of motive/ action model from Chapter 1 and consider the unprecedented public attention that racial profiling has received over the last few years. Between 1986 and 1997, one might assess racial profiling as a practice with severe motives but primarily non-severe actions that went unnoticed by most of the media and the general public. In 1998, however, severe actions – namely, police shootings – alerted the public to a long-standing but long-ignored racial profiling problem in law enforcement. The most severe actions led people to scrutinize the more common police practices, and then to demand an explanation of their motives.

As it turns out, police do have an explanation. But is it justified? I turn next to examine fully the argument in favor of racial profiling, as well as the case against it.

3. **Theoretical Framework: Efficiency and Fairness**

It should be clear by now that the issue of racial profiling has undergone a major transformation since 1998: it has become almost a household term, it has attracted the attention of politicians and the media, and public opinion has rallied against it. But are the media attention and public opinion justified, and on what grounds? The practice of racial profiling as well as any policy-based efforts to eliminate it have moral implications and practical consequences, and it is important to develop a theoretical framework within which to analyze the issue.

In contrast to political advocacy and public opinion, a public policy analysis must be developed within a theoretical framework so as to establish a basis for approving or disapproving of certain policies or policy changes. While political participants may wish to declare that a given policy is “bad” and must be changed, or that it is “good” and must be protected, that type of highly-charged political rhetoric is an unhelpful conversation-stopper in the field of public policy analysis. A theoretical framework tends to give serious consideration to both sides of a policy debate, and then to provide a reasonable basis for reaching a policy recommendation or conclusion.

The most common tool applied to public policy questions is cost-benefit analysis, and a common framework developed is the cost-benefit trade-off of efficiency versus fairness. Not surprisingly, this is a powerful theoretical framework for racial profiling. The practice of racial profiling, it could be argued, improves the efficiency of police work, albeit at the significant price of fairness to (minority) individuals;
correspondingly, policies against racial profiling might improve fairness at the price of efficient law enforcement. This chapter will be devoted partly to whether these benefits and costs are real or fictitious, but it is not unreasonable to begin with these claims as a theoretical framework for a policy debate. Later, I will consider objections to a cost-benefit and fairness-efficiency framework.

This approach will give fair consideration to both sides of the racial profiling debate. Opponents of the practice generally argue that it is wrong for the police to treat people differently based on race. Meanwhile, those who defend racial profiling generally argue that police simply act rationally, so as to maximize arrests and do their jobs efficiently, by targeting individuals who are statistically more likely to engage in criminal behavior. In other words, one side would have you believe that if you care about racial fairness, you must be against racial profiling, whereas the other side would have you believe that if you care about efficient law enforcement, you must support it. What if you care about both, as most people almost certainly do? A cost-benefit analysis will seek to measure the extent to which police efficiency is traded for racial fairness, and will lead to a policy recommendation based on the relative strengths of the efficiency benefit and the fairness cost.

**Benefits: The Efficiency Argument**

The strongest and perhaps only reasonable defense of racial profiling is grounded in the principle of efficiency in law enforcement. The job of a police officer, it is argued, is to maximize the ratio of criminals arrested to individuals investigated; if
that goal is best accomplished by using race as a proxy for criminal behavior (since young black men are, it is argued, the most likely demographic to be involved in illegal drug activity), then it is both acceptable and desirable to profile criminals using race as well as other factors. One need only do basic research to confirm that the statistics are in the racial profiler's favor, or so the argument goes: African Americans make up 12% of the population but are the majority of those convicted for drug crimes. Clearly, then, the rational way to maximize drug arrests is to search the cars of black motorists more often than those of white motorists. Indeed, many conservative writers insist that racial profiling is far from unthinkable; rather, it is the only rational means to efficient law enforcement.

Even prominent liberals who have examined the situation thoroughly concede that the racial discrepancies in the crime rate are relevant to the racial profiling debate. In No Equal Justice, David Cole writes:

Although one cannot simplistically equate prison demographics with the demographics of criminal behavior, most criminologists who have studied the matter have concluded that blacks (and men and young people) do in fact commit crime at a higher per capita rate than whites (and women and older people). Thus, all other things being equal, it is rational to be more suspicious of a young black man than an elderly white woman.

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69 Moss and Korobkin, supra note 58, ctg. Data Collection, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Similarly, Randall Kennedy acknowledges in Race, Crime, and the Law that it is “a vexing question” whether police should be permitted to use racial profiles.\(^\text{72}\)

It does no good to pretend that blacks and whites are similarly situated with respect to either rates of perpetration or rates of victimization.\(^\text{73}\) The familiar dismal statistics and the countless tragedies behind them are not figures of some Negrophobe’s imagination. The country would be better off if that were so. Instead, the statistics confirm what most careful criminologists (regardless of ideological perspective) conclude: In fact (and not only in media portrayal or as a function of police bias) blacks, particularly young black men, commit a percentage of the nation’s street crime that is strikingly disproportionate to their percentage in the nation’s population.\(^\text{73}\)

The efficiency argument, in other words, asserts that law enforcement officials must work in the world as it actually is, not how we would like it to be. Sadly, statistical probabilities require rational police officers to pull over more African-American men in order to arrest more drug traffickers – which, after all, is their job. Absent good reasons not to maximize drug arrests (some of which I shall consider later in this chapter), police officers interested solely in efficient law enforcement are perfectly justified in using race on the road.

Those who oppose racial profiling often counter the efficiency argument by claiming that statistical probabilities are not what they appear to be. First, they argue, African Americans may commit violent crimes more often than whites, but the most reliable surveys indicate that they are only slightly more likely than whites to use drugs.\(^\text{74}\) Second, racial profiling can operate as a self-fulfilling prophesy: it can actually


\(^{73}\) Id. at 145. For similar views, see Trende, supra note 16 at 358-62.

\(^{74}\) Mauer, Race to Incarcerate, supra note 58 at 147. See also Harris, Law Enforcement’s Stake, supra note 58 at 15; and Data Collection, supra note 59 and Moss and Korobkin, supra note 58 at 39. It is estimated that blacks are no more than 15% of the country’s drug users; they make up 12% of the population.
cause racial disparities in arrest and incarceration statistics, thereby exacerbating the racial stereotypes that encourage racial profiling in the first place.\textsuperscript{75}

There is a third claim which seems the most compelling counterargument to the efficiency argument. Statistics from drug searches prove that racial profiling is not an efficient police tactic, it is argued, because even though blacks are far more likely than whites to be searched, they are no more likely to be found with drugs.\textsuperscript{76} Racially-biased drug searches yield the same proportion of drug interdictions from blacks as from whites. This was, in fact, the central argument of an op-ed article by two liberal experts in the field, David Cole and John Lamberth, which appeared in The New York Times in 2001: “If blacks are carrying drugs more often than whites, police should find drugs on the blacks they stop more often than on the whites they stop. But they don’t.”\textsuperscript{77} The article cites statistics from Maryland, where 73% of motorists searched were black but an equal percentage of whites and blacks (28%) were found to be carrying drugs, as well as data from New Jersey, New York, and the U.S. Customs Service.\textsuperscript{78} “The new news,” they claim, “is that racial profiling doesn’t work.”\textsuperscript{79}

But this analysis suffers from some conceptual confusion. If one were to examine “efficiency” from a microeconomic perspective, police searches would have a marginal cost (the cost of each search) and a marginal benefit (the probability of finding contraband). One would expect the marginal cost curve to have zero slope,
since the cost of each search remains constant no matter how many searches are conducted. The marginal benefit curve, however, would be downward-sloping, as one would expect the police to be more accurate in picking out drug traffickers if they only did a few searches as opposed to if they did many searches. If more blacks than whites are in fact carrying drugs, then at any given number of searches the marginal benefit of searching a black driver would exceed that of searching a white driver. Consequently, “efficiency-minded” police would conduct more searches of black drivers until marginal benefits equal marginal costs for both races — in other words, until the hit rates for both races are the same. (See Figure 3.) Therefore, Cole and Lamberth’s claim that unequal search rates and equal hit rates reflect inefficient policing is mistaken; on the contrary, efficiency requires that the hit rates be equal even when the search rates are not.

Figure 3. Efficiency in Law Enforcement I

79 Id.
Admittedly, the microeconomic model I just described includes two important assumptions. The first is that police officers are able to rank-order suspected drug traffickers, such that the hit rate diminishes as more searches are conducted. If motorists, black or white, were searched randomly, then the hit rate would remain the same no matter how many people were searched because it would reflect the true probability that any individual were trafficking drugs. Instead, this model assumes that the hit rate will diminish because police are more likely to find a drug dealer in their eighth search than in their eightieth.

The second assumption is that the average marginal benefit of stopping an African-American driver is greater than the average marginal benefit of stopping a white driver. Under the model described, efficient police behavior requires that this be the case if the police are searching blacks more than they are searching whites and they are generating the same hit rates. But if the police are not behaving efficiently, then they might search blacks more regardless of the marginal benefit of each search. Thus, this model must either presuppose efficient behavior in order to prove differential marginal benefits, or else presuppose differential benefits in order to prove efficiency.

These two assumptions, however, are not problematic, because they are supported by data from the Cole-Lamberth article and the Maryland State Police. Recall the first assumption, diminishing hit rates. Cole and Lamberth report that when the U.S. Customs Service searched fewer people in 2000, its hit rates rose
dramatically. 80 Cole and Lamberth intend to show that conducting fewer searches improves efficiency, but the real conclusion to draw is that hit rates diminish as more searches are conducted – meaning that equal hit rates with unequal search rates reflect unequal drug-trafficking rates.

Now consider the second assumption, a higher marginal benefit of stopping black motorists. According to data from the Maryland State Police, even if the hit rates for blacks and whites were the same, the average quantity of drugs seized was not. On average, blacks carried far higher quantities of drugs than whites. 81 (See Figure 4.) The inverse relationship between quantities and hit rates is clear: police were willing to incur larger total costs searching blacks than whites (that is, search more of them) because the payoff, in terms of quantities of drugs seized, was so much greater. Thus it would make sense, from an efficiency point of view, for the police to search more blacks than whites, even if the hit rates were the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hit Rate</th>
<th>Avg. Quantity Seized</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>0.1 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>111 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>265 g</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Drugs Seized: Hit Rates and Quantity

80 Id. “In 2000, it conducted 61 percent fewer searches than in 1999.... Hit rates for whites and blacks increased by about 125 percent ... while hit rates for Latinos increased more than fourfold.”
The model I described should only be taken for what it is: a theoretical model, and not a complex empirical study, or proof of what truly motivates police behavior. I do not intend to claim that every police officer represents homo economicus, committed to using her resources efficiently and conducting the exact number of searches that will yield the greatest marginal benefit at the lowest marginal cost. But the model does point to a conceptual distinction, highlighted in economics literature, between statistical discrimination, when an agent has no racial animus but treats races differently in order to maximize desired (non-racial) outcomes, and racial prejudice, when an agent treats races differently because discrimination itself is part of her utility function. It appears that equal hit rates reflect statistical discrimination, while hit rates that are lower for minorities than for whites reflect racial prejudice. Furthermore, the model suggests that the Cole-Lamberth interpretation of the Maryland hit rates is not the correct one, and that an efficiency rationale does exist for the police to engage in racial profiling.

A second model to consider briefly assigns efficient utility-maximizing behavior to motorists in addition to the police. Just as in the previous model, the police will search both races at equilibrium levels of marginal costs and marginal benefits. But according to this model, presented in the Journal of Political Economy, if yields were higher for one race over another, then “police would always search these motorists,

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83 According to Knowles, et al., supra at 208, this counterintuitive idea that “tastes for discrimination lead to lower profits for the discriminator” originated with Becker.”
who would in turn react by carrying contraband less often, until the returns to searching are equalized across groups."\textsuperscript{84} According to this theory, then, motorists will consider the probability of being searched before they engage in drug trafficking, and they too will behave at equilibrium levels of marginal cost and marginal benefit. If African Americans derive a greater marginal benefit from drug trafficking than whites (this would be their higher preference or propensity for drug trafficking due to any number of reasons, such as fewer employment opportunities) and they are more likely to be searched by police, then they would respond to the higher search likelihood by choosing to engage in drug trafficking less often. (See Figure 5.) According to this model, both the police and drug traffickers would behave efficiently: the police by doing more searches on groups with a higher propensity to traffic in drugs, and the motorists by carrying drugs at equal rates. Equal hit rates in this model reflect the fact that the unequal search rates "cancel out" the higher propensity of one group to engage in drug trafficking.

This model is more problematic than the first, for it contains three related assumptions which are difficult to verify. The first is the assumption that drug traffickers are self-interested rational agents, capable of modifying their behavior in response to the probability of being searched. The second is the assumption that blacks have a higher preference for drug trafficking than whites, prior to modifying their behavior in response to police activity. The third is the assumption that equal hit rates reflect the true proportions of each sub-group population engaging in drug trafficking.

\textsuperscript{84} Knowles, et al., supra note 82 at 206.
trafficking, rather than a higher proportion due to the ability of police officers to rank-order drug trafficking suspects. Since it is so difficult to verify these controversial assumptions independently, the efficient-criminals model is less convincing than the efficient-police model.\textsuperscript{85}

Figure 5. Efficiency in Law Enforcement II

In summary, the major benefit of racial profiling is its contribution to efficiency in law enforcement. While it is difficult to determine whether police are always acting efficiently, the first model demonstrates that an efficiency argument can

\textsuperscript{85}For other objections to the Knowles study, see David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Seizure Without Cause 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 296, 312 (2001): "The study is objectionable on both methodological and legal grounds."
be made for racial profiling, in contrast to Cole and Lamberth’s claim. There is a second model, which also attempts to justify racial profiling on efficiency grounds, but it is less plausible than the first.

**COSTS: THE FAIRNESS ARGUMENT**

I now turn to the costs of racial profiling, or the individual fairness argument. In some ways, this argument is a relatively simple one and needs little justification. After all, regardless of the extent to which racial profiling benefits efficiency in law enforcement, it is difficult to deny that a law-abiding individual who is treated with more suspicion by police officers because of the color of her skin has a legitimate complaint about the unfairness of her situation. One’s basic expectation in a free society is to be treated fairly by one’s own government, and being the victim of racial profiling cuts against that expectation. But it is also important to move beyond intuitive notions of fairness and basic expectations: to locate the concern for fairness within our political system and political theory, and to consider some of the social costs of unfairness which the efficiency argument neglects.

As the theme of this theoretical framework discussion might suggest, it is not inconsistent to concede some efficiency benefit to racial profiling but still believe the practice is unfair to (minority) individuals. In fact, many claim that it is so unfair as to outweigh very clearly its contribution to efficiency in law enforcement. Consider David Cole, quoted above as acknowledging that “all other things being equal, it is
rational to be more suspicious of a young black man than an elderly white woman.”

Cole goes on to argue, “But that it may be rational does not make it right,” citing historical and legal reasons for dismissing the efficiency argument.

Randall Kennedy, also quoted above as conceding the statistical rationality of racial profiling, joins Cole in his condemnation of the practice overall. Why? “The heart of the answer lies in the special significance of racial distinctions in American life and law,” Kennedy writes. “Race is different.”

Like Cole, Kennedy points to legal distinctions, informed by history, that weigh against trade-offs of individual fairness for efficiency, especially when it comes to race.

I would highlight three related sources of this conception of racial fairness in American life. The first is historical: the ugly legacy of racism and unequal treatment under the law makes any policy compromising fairness for efficiency immediately suspect. The second is the constitutional manifestation of this principle, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that race-conscious policies serve a compelling state interest—a far higher standard than mere statistical efficiency—in order to pass constitutional muster.

The third is the theoretical concept, familiar in political philosophy and public economics, of a social welfare function. Consider a model of society with only two members, A and B, and their total utility (i.e. happiness) in society. (See Figure 6.)

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86 Supra note 71 and accompanying text.
87 Cole, supra at 42.
88 Supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
89 Kennedy, supra at 146, original emphases.
90 Trende, supra note 16 at 362-63.
One can safely assume that in a society with scarce resources, the utility possibility frontier slopes downward, such that if all resources are being used efficiently then making A more happy will necessarily make B less happy, and vice-versa. Moreover, from any point below the utility possibility frontier (point A) it is safe to say that a reallocation of utility northeast (quadrant I) is socially desirable (both parties are made better off) whereas a reallocation of utility southwest (quadrant III) is socially undesirable (both parties are made worse off). What cannot be known, without information about this society’s social welfare function, is whether reallocations to quadrants II or IV are socially acceptable, as they will each make one member of society better off at the expense of the other.

Figure 6. The Need for a Social Welfare Function

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To examine society’s social welfare function, one must include indifference curves, which help indicate what types of utility reallocations make a society better or worse off overall. Any two points along the same indifference curve make no difference in the overall welfare of society, whereas all points above an indifference curve represent greater social welfare and all points below represent less social welfare.

In a utilitarian social welfare function, social welfare is the sum of all utility, such that the indifference curves are 45-degree lines and a reallocation of utility is socially desirable if and only if one person is made more better off than the other person is made worse off. (See Figure 7a.) In a maximin (Rawlsian) social welfare function, in contrast, society is only as well off as its worst off member: indifference curves are 90-degree angles and a reallocation of utility is socially desirable if and only if one person is made better off without the other person being made worse off. (See Figure 7b.)

The social welfare function models can be used to analyze racial profiling in a fairness-based theoretical framework, because A and B can be made to represent groups of people in society, such as whites and African Americans, instead of individuals. In such a model, the combined utility of each group’s members increases if they are subject to a lower proportion of stops/searches and decreases if they are subject to a greater proportion; thus, stopping/searching one group at a higher rate necessarily increases the utility of the other group, and vice-versa. In the context of racial profiling, any gain in utility by one group (whites) comes at the price of a loss in utility by another group (African Americans). A utilitarian social welfare function
would permit that as long as the gain were greater than the loss, but a maximin welfare function would not.\footnote{For a similar discussion contrasting Bayesian and contractarian approaches to racial profiling, see}
What sort of social welfare function best represents our shared conception of fairness in liberal democratic society? It would have to be closer to the maximin function than the utilitarian function, since we would say, in general, that it is unfair to trade off any one individual's utility for that of someone else – even if the gainer of utility gained more than the loser lost. The philosopher John Rawls has made a famously powerful argument (outside the context of racial profiling) in favor of the maximin social welfare function, and his argument includes the distinction between the rational and the reasonable touched upon by Cole and Kennedy above. According to Rawls, if we could rationally choose a conception of justice from an “original position” – absent our knowledge of both our social position in life and our personal tastes and preferences – then we would choose a conception of justice that incorporates the maximin principle. Any deviation from that principle subsequent to our departure from the original position (for selfish purposes, say, or for the sake of efficiency) might be rational, as Cole and Kennedy acknowledge, but, because we would not approve of it from the original position, it would not be reasonable. Seen from this perspective, efficiency in law enforcement makes racial profiling rational, but fairness makes it unreasonable. Simply put, we would never choose to live in a

Howard McGary, “Police Discretion and Discrimination” in Kleinig, supra note 6 at 134.
93 An example involving racial justice is the set of regulations involving insurance premiums: “[S]tate and federal laws uniformly prohibit race from being used as a factor in making actuarial calculations, despite the fact that, from the insurance industry’s perspective, it would be a useful predictive criterion.” Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law, supra note 72, at 147 fn.
95 Id.
society whose conception of justice permitted racial profiling if we did not know in advance whether we would be victimized by it.

Like the efficiency model, it is important to keep the Rawlsian model in perspective. It is unrealistic to expect that all aspects of society be run strictly according to the maximin principle, just as it would be unrealistic to expect that police officers always operate with efficiency as their chief goal. But Rawls makes a convincing argument that the maximin principle is an essential component of justice in our society, a conception of justice he calls “justice as fairness.” And if we are to expect that the government aspire to treat racial issues fairly more than efficiently, as the historical and constitutional arguments suggest it should,96 then it is incumbent upon police agencies to use something close to the Rawlsian social welfare function in their stop-and-search practices.

The fairness argument is only strengthened by the presence of additional costs, associated with loss of fairness in this context, that racial profiling entails. In addition to violating basic principles of fairness, racial profiling can have deleterious psychological, social and economic effects on its victims.97 Racial profiling is likely to have a negative effect on community relations between minorities and the police, and members of those communities are less likely to have confidence that the police protect them rather than harass them.98 Finally, racial profiling is subject to the

96 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
98 Cole, supra note 71 at 170; Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra at 307-309; and Trende, supra note 16 at 362-63.
“slippery slope” argument: even if police can justify some level of racial profiling on efficiency grounds, the likelihood that police will over-rely on racial profiling to conduct stops and searches, coupled with the likelihood that bigoted police officers will manifest their prejudice under the pretense of official duties, make racial profiling too dangerous a practice to endorse even to a limited extent and even given efficiency justifications. In short, the efficiency benefits of racial profiling are outweighed by the fairness costs.

Caveats

Briefly, the cost-benefit breakdown constitutes more than simple efficiency benefits and fairness costs. While the theoretical framework I have discussed in this chapter can be generally summarized as such, there are exceptions to both arguments. Some have argued, for instance, that racial profiling hinders efficient law enforcement; others claim that it supports fairness. Additionally, there is the possibility that the cost-benefit framework itself may be inappropriate for this issue.

I will begin with the principal exception to the efficiency argument. As discussed above, the costs associated with a loss of fairness include a breakdown in trust between minority communities and the police. This is surely a cost borne by the members of those communities, as is the loss of fairness. But it is also a cost borne by the police in those communities who seek to maximize arrests and convictions. It has been suggested that this breakdown in trust can lead to race-based jury nullification, as

99 Wasserman, supra note 97 at 119.
African-American jurors might not believe the testimony of police officers in criminal trials and might be inclined to compensate for unfair police practices by acquitting defendants they would otherwise convict. In other words, police who think they are being efficient by stopping and searching minorities at higher rates may actually be contributing to an efficiency loss by harming their relationship with the communities they serve. Without the support of the public, law enforcement officers have a much tougher job.

On the other hand, some argue that racial profiling might actually benefit minority communities, not harm them. According to the “urban frustration” argument, many African Americans who are poor and live in the inner city would prefer that the police concentrate on their neighborhoods more, not less. Since criminals are most likely to affect individuals of their own racial group in their own communities, it would make sense for low-income minorities to be more frustrated by crime than whites. This throws a wrench in the utility model associating more racial profiling with less utility for African Americans; in fact, blacks as a group might benefit from the increased efficiency in law enforcement that racial profiling could bring about, and individuals within those communities might be willing to sacrifice some of their civil liberties in exchange for safer neighborhoods. Thus, the racial

100 Harris, Law Enforcement’s Stake, supra note 58 at 19.
102 Id. at 1220.
103 Id. at 1230. But Brooks contends that public opinion surveys do not, in fact, support the argument that inner-city African Americans would prefer differential enforcement to high crime.
fairness “cost” of racial profiling might be seen as a cost to some individuals but a benefit to entire minority communities.

Lastly, two related arguments could be made against a cost-benefit analysis in general for this type of public policy issue. First, public policy costs and benefits are normally quantifiable, whereas this discussion has been almost entirely qualitative in nature. The advantage of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis is that the sum of the costs and benefits, if inclusive of all externalities, quite clearly determines the policy recommendation. But the qualitative method used in this chapter naturally relies on more subjective analyses of the relative strength of each cost and each benefit. Second, it could be argued that the very nature of a rights-based constitution forbids the use of cost-benefit analysis when constitutional rights are at stake, since rights are designed either to “trump” other policy concerns or to act as “exclusionary reasons” not to be weighed against other reasons.

Both these arguments can be supported by the historical example of Korematsu v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the segregation of Japanese Americans in detention camps during World War II on the grounds that Equal Protection violations were overcome by a compelling state interest during wartime. In that case, the Court used an analysis similar to cost-benefit: constitutional rights could be overcome by other policy concerns, and their strength was to be determined

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by the subjective, qualitative evaluation of a nation overwhelmed by war. History, of course, has judged the Korematsu decision wrong-headed both in form and in substance, and its error serves as a warning to others who would apply cost-benefit logic to policies where constitutional rights are at stake.

These exceptions and objections to the cost-benefit, fairness-efficiency framework are legitimate concerns, though I do not believe they threaten the overall integrity of the theoretical framework. First, the efficiency loss experienced by police when they lose the trust of minority communities is a real phenomenon, but it is no more a problem now than it has been for decades; thus, the stop-and-search efficiency model should incorporate that drawback into its marginal benefits and costs. Second, the extent to which racial profiling may benefit the communities in which it occurs (by lowering crime in those areas) is part of a larger trade-off between respect and safety; it has no bearing on the costs of racial profiling to the notion of fairness to individuals. Lastly, the Korematsu decision may be an example of a cost-benefit analysis gone wrong, but in the context of most public policy it is difficult to refute the usefulness of the cost-benefit analysis tool itself. As this chapter has made clear, there are in fact real trade-offs in most policy debates, even those involving race, rights and fairness, and only a complete consideration of the trade-off between efficiency and fairness can justify a policy preference in favor of the latter.

Of course, any change in policy will have its own costs and benefits. Even if, as I have argued in this chapter, the costs of racial profiling outweigh the benefits, there is

no guarantee that the benefits of any proposed policy remedies will outweigh the costs. But before I turn to the quintessential policy-making bodies, the legislatures, I need to examine the role of the courts, which are also policy-makers, in sustaining this debate.
4. **The Courts: Passing the Buck**

Legal challenges to racial profiling have looked primarily to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, though state constitutions and federal civil rights laws have been invoked as well. The Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures," limits the discretion of police to stop, question, frisk and search citizens, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the "equal protection of the laws," limits the ability of law enforcement to discriminate based on race. 109 Racial profiling claims, however, encounter heavy burdens under the courts' search-and-seizure and Equal Protection doctrine. In recent years, the Supreme Court has all but closed the books on claims based on the Fourth Amendment. Equal protection and state constitutional claims may still be open to consideration by some courts, but these claims face high hurdles and an uncertain future. 110

Pertinent to current legal doctrine in this field is the distinction between motive and action I introduced in Chapter 1 and continued to discuss in Chapter 2. In Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to consider the motive (or "subjective intentions") of police officers, as long as they act under objectively reasonable circumstances. But in Fourteenth Amendment cases, it is the action (or impact) of the police, which the courts are often unwilling to consider, as long as the

109 U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV.
110 See generally Patrik Jonsson, "Courts Balk at Limiting Racial Profiling," The Christian Science Monitor 6 July 2001: 1; Rudovsky, supra note 85 at 296; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 97; David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556 (1998); and Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, supra note 19.
officer’s intent is not proved particularly pernicious. At first glance, one might imagine that the court has covered all bases: the Fourth Amendment takes care of action and the Fourteenth Amendment takes care of intent. In fact, however, the opposite is true. Under the Fourth Amendment, the court demands evidence of wrong action where evidence for racial profiling is strongest for motive, while under the Fourteenth Amendment the court demands evidence of wrong motive where evidence for racial profiling is strongest for action. (See Figure 8.) As a result, even good evidence of racial profiling can prove ineffective in the courtroom. This will become clear as I review the case law below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Profiling Evidence</th>
<th>Supreme Court Doctrine</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Motive/Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Amend.</td>
<td>Action/Impact</td>
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Figure 8. Supreme Court Doctrine: Motive and Action

**Fourth Amendment Analysis**

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” but the Supreme Court has long recognized an “automobile exception” to the normal Fourth Amendment requirement that law enforcement officials obtain a warrant
before conducting a search. In California v. Carney (1985), the court reviewed this
long-standing exception: “In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which
necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to
ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate
so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.”
Additionally, the court
held in Terry v. Ohio (1968) that “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and in Delaware v. Prouse (1979) the court declared that
police officers cannot order drivers to stop their cars absent “probable cause” for
believing they have violated the traffic code or “reasonable suspicion” that they are
engaging in some other illegal activity. The Carney-Terry-Prouse framework balances
a motorist’s interest in privacy with the state’s interest in effective law enforcement
absent the opportunity to obtain a warrant for search and seizure.

Where do racial profiling “pretext stops” fit into this context? That is, what
does the Fourth Amendment have to say about a police officer whose real reason for
stopping a (black) driver is not based on reasonable suspicion, but who happens to
have probable cause to make the stop for a minor traffic violation? The Supreme
Court addressed that question in 1996 in Whren v. United States. In Whren, plain-
clothed District of Columbia police officers were patrolling a “high drug area” in an

\[111\] U.S. Const., amend. IV.
\[112\] 471 U.S. 386, 392 (emphasis added), reviewing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and South
97 at 310; and H arris, Car Wars, supra note 110 at 565-66.
\[113\] 392 U.S. 1, 16.
\[114\] 440 U.S. 648, 661.
unmarked car when they observed “a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants” wait too long at a stop sign and then abruptly turn away at a high speed and without signaling. The officers followed the truck, ordered the driver to stop, and observed crack cocaine through the windows in plain view. At their trial, the defendants, who were black, claimed that the evidence had been collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment, since the arresting officers had no reasonable suspicion that the defendants possessed drugs but were using the minor traffic violations, for which they had probable cause, as a pretext for a drug search.

The defendants argued that the traffic code is so expansive that it is virtually impossible to drive without continually committing technical violations, and that given only the technical violations for which the officers in this case had probable cause, no reasonable officer in the same situation would have made the stop.

The Supreme Court did not contest either of these claims when they heard Whren, but the defendants still lost their case. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia declared that the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard was whether reasonable officers could have made the stop, not whether they would have done so. The reasonableness standard did not depend on the “actual motivations of the individual officers involved.... Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Furthermore, if those subjective

\[115\] 517 U.S. 806.
\[116\] Id. at 808.
\[117\] Id. at 809.
\[118\] Id.
\[119\] Id. at 810.
\[120\] Id. at 813.
intentions included race, then that point must be litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. In other words, there is nothing unconstitutional, in terms of the Fourth Amendment, with a pretext stop, because the only thing wrong with it is the police officer’s personal motives, not her objective actions. Whren has thus effectively closed the books on Fourth Amendment challenges to racial profiling pretext stops, because the police can always name some traffic violation a driver has committed and use it as an excuse to stop any driver for any reason.

The Supreme Court has made a number of other decisions in the last few years which seem to hammer a few more nails into the Fourth Amendment coffin. In Ohio v. Robinette (1996), the court ruled 8-1 that police officers who do not have probable cause but ask drivers for consent to conduct a search are not required to inform them that they are in fact free to go. Declaring that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness” and that “[r]easonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,” the court concluded that, although the “Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary,” it would be “unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent search may be deemed voluntary.” Just as the subjective intent of the police officer is irrelevant in Whren,

121 Id.
122 See Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, supra note 19 at 557-59.
125 519 U.S. 33, 40.
the subjective condition of the driver is irrelevant in Robinette; as long as the “totality of the circumstances,” objectively considered, meets a certain standard of “reasonableness,” then the Fourth Amendment has not been violated.

This line of reasoning seems to go against the spirit of constitutional guarantees the court has articulated in other significant cases. The conditions under which one may plead guilty, provide information under custodial interrogation, appear in a line-up, or even renounce one’s citizenship must be “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”

In fact, the fundamental basis for the famous requirement that police inform suspects of their Miranda rights, a requirement reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2000, is that citizens ought to know about the rights they have before they can surrender them. As Justice Goldberg wrote in a 1964 right-to-counsel decision, “No system of criminal justice can, or should survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.” In Robinette, however, the Supreme Court has basically conceded that a waiver of one’s rights need not be “knowing and intelligent” in order to be voluntary. In No Equal Justice, David Cole captures the implications of this decision for racial profiling: “The current system creates two Fourth Amendments—one for people who are aware of their right to say no and confident enough to assert

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128 See Miranda, supra note 126 at 444: “Prior to any questioning, [a] person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
that right against a police officer, and another for those who do not know their rights or are afraid to assert them.”

Two Fourth Amendments, so to speak, were also affirmed by the court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001). In Edmond, the Supreme Court held that a highway checkpoint program which indiscriminately stopped vehicles so that drug-sniffing dogs could inspect them for narcotics constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. But the court upheld its earlier decision in United States v. Place (1983) that, given reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop, drug-sniffing by a narcotics dog did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, then, created another Fourth Amendment double standard: police cannot subject the population as a whole to drug-sniffing, but they can use their subjective intentions, consistent with the Whren “could have” standard, to subject a few unlucky individuals to the procedure.

Similarly, Atwater affirms the Fourth Amendment’s role in limiting the objective circumstances, but not the subjective intentions, under which police officers may act. The court in Atwater held 5-4 that a police officer could make a full custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense, such as failure to wear a seatbelt, without violating the Fourth Amendment. Significantly, Justice O’Connor, usually in the conservative camp of the court, dissented from Atwater in part because of its likely consequences.

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130 Cole, supra note 71 at 31.
131 531 U.S. 32.
132 532 U.S. 318.
133 462 U.S. 696.
for certain motorists: “Such unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse.... Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual.”134 The O’Connor dissent may signal a growing awareness by some of the justices that an intent-blind Fourth Amendment doctrine can, for certain citizens, undermine the very protection it was designed to provide. Still, the Atwater decision, coupled with Edmond, Robinette and Whren, leaves almost no room for racial profiling claims under the Fourth Amendment.

These cases do point to a role for the legislature in search-and-seizure issues. In Atwater, the majority decision acknowledges that many states

have chosen to impose more restrictive safeguards through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenses.... It is of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the Constitution, simply because the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader principle.135

Significantly, Justice O’Connor, who wrote the dissent in Atwater, is the only justice to have served previously as a lawmaker.136 It is likely that the majority wishes to defer to legislatures the task of restricting police activities when necessary, while O’Connor may recognize the difficulty a legislature might have, given electoral accountability, in restricting police activities without a constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, lawmakers have been invited to take action.

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134 Atwater, supra note 132 at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 576. The court cites laws in Alabama, California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, South Dakota, Tennessee and Virginia.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The Whren decision directed concerns regarding racial bias in pretext stops to Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: the “constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”\(^{137}\) That clause guarantees that “[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”\(^{138}\) But the court took no notice of how difficult claims under the Equal Protection Clause have become. Racial profiling violates the Fourteenth Amendment in theory, but in practice the victim must carry a heavy burden of proof.

Relevant Equal Protection doctrine begins with Washington v. Davis (1976)\(^{139}\) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977),\(^{140}\) which held that in order for government action to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, it must be discriminatory both in effect and in purpose. Disproportionate impact “is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious discrimination,” the court wrote.\(^{141}\) “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”\(^{142}\) Only a successful showing of both disparate impact and discriminatory purpose will trigger what is known as strict scrutiny, which prohibits racial discrimination unless

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\(^{136}\) Justice O’Connor “was appointed to the Arizona State Senate in 1969 and was subsequently reelected to two two-year terms.” Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court, online at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf>.

\(^{137}\) Whren, supra note 115 at 813.

\(^{138}\) U.S. Const., amend. XIV.

\(^{139}\) 426 U.S. 229.

\(^{140}\) 429 U.S. 252.

\(^{141}\) Davis, supra note 139 at 242.
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” In general, a
government policy or practice containing an “express racial classification” – an explicit
statement of race-based treatment – may proceed directly to strict scrutiny analysis;
otherwise, plaintiffs must normally rely on statistical evidence to establish disparate
impact and then non-statistical evidence to prove intent. Thus, a racial profiling
complaint under the Fourteenth Amendment must prove intentional discrimination in
addition to a racially disparate impact. Thus, a study (such as those from New Jersey
and Maryland) showing that minorities are statistically more likely to be stopped
and searched than whites might be one way to establish a disparate impact claim, but it
does not prove discriminatory intent.

In addition to Davis and Arlington Heights, racial profiling litigation follows
four important Equal Protection cases of the 1980s and 90s, two of which established
successful Equal Protection claims and two of which did not. The successful cases
were Batson v. Kentucky (1986), in which a prosecutor’s exclusion of African

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142 Arlington Heights, supra note 140 at 265.
143 See Rudovsky, supra note 85 at 322, ctg. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) and Shaw v. Reno,
144 See Rudovsky, supra at 322. On rare occasions statistical evidence alone may serve to prove intent,
though this has been recognized by the court only in jury selection and redistricting cases. See Chavez
145 Until recently, individuals could file a federal statutory, rather than constitutional, civil rights lawsuit
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., of which the implementing
regulations require only a showing of discriminatory impact, not intent. See Rudovsky, supra at 330.
However, the Supreme Court recently overturned decades of precedent in 9 of 12 circuits by ruling that
individuals do not have a private right of action under the implementing regulations to Title VI.
146 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
147 See Rudovsky, supra at 322-29.
148 476 U.S. 79.
Americans from a jury through peremptory challenges was held to be unconstitutional, and Hunter v. Underwood (1985),\textsuperscript{149} in which an Alabama state constitutional provision disenfranchising those convicted of crimes “involving moral turpitude” was struck down. The unsuccessful cases were McCleskey v. Kemp (1987),\textsuperscript{150} in which the court rejected a death row prisoner’s claim that his capital sentence should be overturned on the basis of statistical evidence that there is a significant racial bias in death penalty sentences, and United States v. Armstrong (1996),\textsuperscript{151} in which the plaintiffs failed to convince the court that blacks were selectively prosecuted for federal crack-cocaine offenses even though every one of the 24 cases handled by the federal public defender in 1991 involved a black defendant.

While Batson and Hunter may at first appear to offer some hope to racial profiling litigants, McCleskey and Armstrong prove to be more like most racial profiling cases, and they have established difficult burdens. First, Batson and Hunter both deal with civic participation, whereas McCleskey and Armstrong, like racial profiling, deal with selective enforcement of the criminal law. Second, McCleskey was distinguished from Batson by the court in part because Batson relied on a racial pattern of peremptory challenges from only one prosecutor while McCleskey presented statistics involving many prosecutors and many defendants: “requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from

\textsuperscript{149} 471 U. S. 222.
\textsuperscript{150} McCleskey, supra note 144.
\textsuperscript{151} 517 U. S. 456.
requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts.” Like McCleskey, any statistical study of racial profiling is likely to involve many different police officers and motorists, not just a few. Third, the McCleskey court additionally required that the defendant “prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose,” a difficult task both for McCleskey and for any black driver armed with solid racial profiling data but no proof of intent in his or her case. Fourth, the court in Armstrong stressed that the study presented by the defendants “failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were not so prosecuted.” This “similarly situated” standard was easily met in Hunter, since the plaintiffs were able to prove that blacks were 1.7 times more likely to be disenfranchised than whites; in contrast, in Armstrong and any racial profiling case, similarly situated individuals would be hard to come by since they, presumably by virtue of being white, were not arrested or stopped in the first place. Fifth, even a fairly strong “similarly situated” claim may not suffice: the majority in Armstrong rejected the defendant’s affidavits that drug users in rehab centers were as likely to be whites as minorities, that a highly-experienced defender had never handled a crack case in federal court involving non-black defendants, and that state courts do prosecute whites for crack. It is difficult,

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152 Rudovsky, supra note 85 at 324, ctg. McCleskey, supra note 144 at 296.
153 McCleskey, supra at 292 (original emphasis).
154 Armstrong, supra note 151 at 470.
155 Id. at 467, ctg. Hunter, supra note 149.
156 Armstrong, supra note 151 at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
then, to conceive of “similarly situated” evidence, let alone proof of discriminatory intent, that would meet the court’s high standards for Equal Protection.

To demonstrate how difficult an Equal Protection claim can be, I turn now to Chavez v. Illinois State Police (7th Cir. 2001), one of the few racial profiling cases to undergo comprehensive analysis in federal court. The case was originally filed in August 1994 by Peso Chavez, who is Hispanic, and Gregory Lee, who is African-American, against the Illinois State Police and its Operation Valkyrie, a drug interdiction program. Chavez was originally designed as an ACLU “test case” and was one of the first racial profiling lawsuits, but the plaintiffs ended up losing in district court, and then on appeal, on almost every claim.

The appeals court began its Equal Protection analysis by reviewing the plaintiffs’ evidence for discriminatory effect. Following Armstrong, the court demanded that the plaintiffs meet the “similarly situated” standard “by naming such [similarly situated] individuals or through the use of statistics.” One plaintiff, Chavez, was able to name a similarly situated white individual, though the appeals court had to reverse the district court ruling that he had not. The other plaintiff, Lee, relied on statistics based on the records kept by some state troopers when they conducted vehicle searches. But these records, which were not representative of all the vehicles the Valkyrie officers stopped and did not include information about the

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157 And expensive. At one point, the plaintiffs subpoenaed “electronic data on licensed Illinois drivers” and were told they would have to pay “the statutory rate for provision of such information,” which amounted to $160,200. The court upheld this fee. Id. at 627. Later, the plaintiffs gave up their case and were ordered by the court to pay the defendants their costs, which amounted to $22,800.72. Id. Needless to say, few individuals are willing to risk these sort of expenses to challenge police practices.

158 Chavez, supra note 144.
overall population that drove on the Illinois highways, were “simply insufficient as a matter of law.”\(^{160}\) As it was impossible to determine, based on the statistics provided, that similarly situated white drivers were not being stopped and searched, Lee could not establish disparate impact. Thus, even a statistical study of racial profiling was not sufficient to show that there had been a discriminatory effect.

Next the court turned to discriminatory intent, for Chavez had been successful in his discriminatory effect claim by naming a similarly situated individual. Following McCleskey, the court required that Chavez prove that the police officers in his particular case acted with purposeful discrimination.\(^{161}\) The officer who had stopped Lee, the other plaintiff, had asked for consent to search because “one can never tell with you people.”\(^{162}\) However, that statement was not part of Chavez’s stop and could not serve, in his case, as evidence of intentional discrimination. Chavez did provide evidence from a deposition in which one of the troopers involved with his search acknowledged that “a motorist’s race is one ‘indicator’ that ‘you’ve got to keep in mind.’”\(^{163}\) However, the court did not find that piece of evidence compelling enough to establish intent. In fact, the court noted that the officer who filled out Chavez’s citation marked him as white rather than Hispanic, suggesting that the officer did not even know Chavez was Hispanic – despite his surname and the recent publicity over state troopers in New Jersey purposely misreporting the race of the drivers they

\(^{159}\) Id. at 636.
\(^{160}\) Id. at 641.
\(^{161}\) Id. at 645.
\(^{162}\) Id.
\(^{163}\) Id.
stopped. Having found no convincing evidence of discriminatory intent, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim.

The Chavez case was unique in its duration – seven years – but not in its outcome. Can discriminatory impact plus intent ever be proved in a racial profiling case? The answer is yes, though very rarely. In Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, a public defender and Harvard Law School graduate filed suit alleging Equal Protection violations after he had been pulled over and detained for no apparent reason by the Maryland State Police. During the discovery phase of the case, a state police memo surfaced which had been issued just a few days before Wilkins was stopped and instructed police officers in that area to watch for drug traffickers, “predominantly black males and black females.” Wilkins’ lawyers had found the smoking gun of discriminatory intent, and the Maryland State Police settled the lawsuit out of court.

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165 Chavez, supra at 648.

166 In Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2nd Cir. 1999), the police were sued, under the Equal Protection Clause, after sweeping a college campus for all African-American males at the school because the victim of a nearby crime had described her assailant as a young black male. Id. at 334. However, the court found that the police officers’ policy “was race-neutral on its face” and “a legitimate classification within which potential suspects might be found,” and that the “plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege discriminatory intent.” Id. at 337-38. Plaintiffs in National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 167 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999), the case challenging the N Y P D’s Street Crimes Unit (known for the Amadou Diallo shooting), ran into similar trouble: their Equal Protection claim was dismissed, following Armstrong, for failure to prove the existence of similarly situated individuals, though it has since been revived based on some of the court’s holdings in Oneonta. 191 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1999).

167 Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, supra note 19 at 551 fn. 44.


169 Harris, supra at 564.

170 Id. at 565.

171 Id. The settlement included damages and attorney’s fees, as well as an agreement to end racial profiling and to collect data on traffic stops. The traffic stop data over the next few years proved what Wilkins accused: that the police were pulling over and searching minorities at far higher rates than whites. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
The smoking gun, though, rarely exists and is almost impossible to find. If Equal Protection claims must rely on state police memos like the one in Wilkins, then the Fourteenth Amendment will do little to protect motorists from racial profiling.

There is evidence in the Equal Protection case law I reviewed that the courts are aware of the limited role they play in the racial profiling debate. In Brown v. City of Oneonta, in which the court dismissed an Equal Protection racial profiling claim, the 2nd Circuit stated:

We are also not unmindful of the impact of this police action on community relations. Law enforcement officials should always be cognizant of the impressions they leave on a community, lest distrust of law enforcement undermines its effectiveness.... Yet our role is not to evaluate whether the police action in question was the appropriate response under the circumstances, but to determine whether what was done violated the Equal Protection Clause.

Just as the Atwater decision leaves room for state legislation stricter than the Fourth Amendment, the Oneonta decision seems almost to welcome a policy response, either from the legislature or a police agency itself, to limit police activity in ways in which this court does not. The same courts that reject a constitutional basis for prohibiting racial profiling themselves provide the context for new public policies to that end.

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172 Oneonta, supra note 166.
173 Id. at 339.
174 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

It is important to give brief consideration to one further judicial avenue of combating racial profiling: claims filed in state courts under state constitutions. In Whren, the U.S. Supreme Court made it impossible to find relief for race-based pretext stops under the Fourth Amendment, ruling that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” This ruling, however, placed no constraints on the ability of state courts to interpret state constitutional provisions as providing greater search-and-seizure protection. Many state constitutions have guarantees similar to that of the Fourth Amendment, but state courts are under no obligation to follow federal search-and-seizure doctrine when interpreting those provisions.

This was, in fact, the basis of the 1996 ruling in New Jersey that the state police had an unlawful de facto policy of racial profiling. In that case, State v. Soto, the trial judge suppressed evidence in the cases of 17 African-American motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike largely on the basis of statistical evidence in the Lamberth study. In deciding to suppress evidence based on search-and-seizure analysis, the judge wrote:

Generally ... the inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a stop or a search and seizure is limited to “whether the conduct of the law enforcement officer who undertook the stop or search was objectively reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or intent.” Thus, it has been said that the courts will not inquire into the motivation of a police officer whose stop of a vehicle was based upon a traffic violation committed in his presence. But where objective evidence establishes “that a police agency has embarked upon an officially sanctioned or de facto policy of targeting minorities for

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175 Whren, supra note 115 at 813.
investigation and arrest,” any evidence seized will be suppressed to deter
future insolence in office by those charged with the enforcement of the
law and to maintain judicial integrity.¹⁷⁷

This analysis is much more protective of Fourth Amendment-type liberties than
Whren, as it permits courts to take the subjective intentions of police officers into
account in search-and-seizure rulings. It effectively makes room for a “would have”
standard – an examination of whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop
based on the objective circumstances – in place of the “could have” standard adopted in
Whren.

While the state-level case law and state constitutions do not permit stricter
search-and-seizure limits than the federal constitution in all jurisdictions, several states
have followed (or could follow) New Jersey in deviating from Whren and federal
Fourth Amendment doctrine.¹⁷⁸ Note that this means state courts could rely on state
statutes to limit police powers as well – statutes directly addressing racial profiling.
These practices, much like the dicta in Atwater and Oneonta mentioned earlier, point
to a role for police agencies and legislatures in limiting police powers beyond
constitutional restrictions as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In other words, the
federal courts have largely passed the buck to the states and their legislatures when it

¹⁷⁷ Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
1999) and State v. Donahue, 742 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1999); and Harris, The Stores, the Statistics, and the Law,
Supreme Court might interpret the state constitution to decide Whren-like cases, see Phyllis W. Beck
and Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy
Concerns 72 Temple L. Rev. 597 (1999): “...departures from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have
occurred, establishing Pennsylvania as a state that ‘guards individual privacy rights more zealously than
the federal government.’ Clearly, the historical treatment of [the state constitution] militates in favor of
divergence.” Id. at 607.
comes to racial profiling. The next chapter, then, will discuss the role of legislation in seeking solutions to racial profiling.
5. LEGISLATION: MANDATES AND MESSAGES

Legislative efforts to address racial profiling have largely mirrored the rise in public awareness and debate, beginning in the late 1990s and becoming more widespread in 2000 and 2001. As we shall see, racial profiling legislation, both as proposed and enacted, has also followed another pattern: it has often been more symbolic than substantive. Legislatures have, by and large, sent a strong message but a weak mandate.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act (TSSSA), the first piece of legislation to deal directly with racial profiling, was introduced by Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) in 1997 and has been reintroduced in every session of Congress since then.¹⁷⁹ In 1998, the measure was passed by the House of Representatives but was not acted on by the Senate.¹⁸⁰ In the next Congress, the bill was passed by the House Judiciary Committee but not voted on by the full House, and an identical bill introduced in the U.S. Senate was the subject of subcommittee hearings but did not reach the floor for a vote.¹⁸¹ In the current Congress, the bill has been packaged as part of the Protecting Civil Rights for All Americans Act in the Senate but has not been acted on.¹⁸²

¹⁸² 107 Bill Tracking S. 19.
Though TSSSA has undergone minor changes in its various forms, its central provisions call for the U.S. Attorney General to conduct a statistical study on traffic stops around the country, first by reviewing existing data and then by collecting data from a nationwide sample.\footnote{H.R. 1443, supra note 179, § 2.} The list of data categories required is extensive; police officers must record:

- the alleged traffic violation;
- the driver’s race, gender and age;
- whether the driver’s immigration status is questioned;
- the number of occupants in the vehicle stopped;
- whether a search is conducted and whether consent was requested;
- the justification for the search;
- the result of the search;
- whether a citation or warning is issued;
- whether an arrest is made, and why; and
- the duration of the stop.\footnote{Id.}

The Attorney General would have authority to grant police agencies funds to facilitate the data collection,\footnote{Id., § 3.} and a national report would be issued by the Justice Department.\footnote{Id., § 2.}

Though it is difficult to imagine at first why one would oppose TSSSA, the bill in fact has several drawbacks. Its obvious benefit, or so proponents argue, would be to provide comprehensive statistics with consistent types of data so that the public could have a reliable way to determine if racial profiling exists. However, the bill does not require that the data collection include the location of the stops, the driving population demographics or crime rates of the surrounding area, or provisions for

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{H.R. 1443, supra note 179, § 2.}
\item \footnote{Id.}
\item \footnote{Id., § 3.}
\item \footnote{Id., § 2.}
\end{itemize}
interpreting the data. Locally collected traffic stop data already exist in many jurisdictions around the United States, so TSSSA data may not add much valuable information to the existing pool. Furthermore, the bill does not provide for any action to be taken against police agencies and officers who do engage in racial profiling, and, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the courts are reluctant to acknowledge statistical information in civil rights litigation. Given these drawbacks, TSSSA may be a costly program that maintains controversy without doing much to attack the problem.

Some of these drawbacks have been addressed in more recent legislation under different title. For example, the End Racial Profiling Act of 2001,\textsuperscript{187} in addition to mandating data collection,\textsuperscript{188} prohibits racial profiling,\textsuperscript{189} provides for a private right of legal action for those who are victimized by it,\textsuperscript{190} and would deny federal funding to police agencies that do not end the practice.\textsuperscript{191} A separate bill, the Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, would deny federal highway funding to states whose police agencies engage in racial profiling.\textsuperscript{192} But these bills also have several points of weakness. They do not strictly define what constitutes racial profiling, either for the purpose of withholding funding or to sue law enforcement officials, and they garnered little support or action in Congress last year.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{188}H.R. 2074, supra, § 401.
\textsuperscript{189}Id. § 101.
\textsuperscript{190}Id. § 102.
\textsuperscript{191}Id. § 301.
\end{flushright}
Surprisingly, TSSSA and its successors have not been ineffective - despite their substantive problems and the low probability that they will be enacted. Far from dying in committee time and again without anyone ever knowing about them, TSSSA has been the impetus for publicity, executive action, and similar statutes at the state level. When TSSSA was introduced in 1997, there were virtually no police agencies collecting traffic stop data for the purpose of addressing racial profiling. But two states passed racial profiling legislation in 1999, five states in 2000, and 11 states in 2001. The majority of those laws include data collection provisions modeled after Rep. Conyers’ TSSSA. In addition, President Clinton ordered all federal law enforcement agencies to collect race data on their stop and search practices beginning in 1999, and he specifically challenged state and local agencies to follow the federal example.

In addition to influencing directly the lives of Americans through legislation, Congress often reflects the attitudes of the public without taking direct action based on those attitudes. These secondary activities should not be regarded as ineffectual, however, because the articulation of a pressing concern on the national level can indirectly bring about action at other levels and in other venues of American politics.

193 Harris, Law Enforcement’s Stake, supra note 58 at 31. Trende, supra note 16 at 341.
196 California (2000 CA S.B. 1102); Colorado (2001 CO H.B. 1114); Florida (2001 FL S.B. 84); Kentucky (2001 KY S.B. 76); Louisiana (2001 LA H.B. 1855); Maryland (2001 MD H.B. 303); Massachusetts (1999 MA S.B. 2238); Nebraska (2001 NE L.B. 593); Nevada (2001 NV A.B. 500); Oklahoma (1999 OK S.B. 1444); and Texas (2001 TX S.B. 1074).
As a piece of legislation, Conyers’ bill delivers no mandate - both in content and in having never been enacted. But by putting the issue of racial profiling on the American political agenda, it has both set an example and sent a powerful message to policy-makers everywhere and the public at large.

STATE LEGISLATION

Nineteen states have passed racial profiling legislation, all but one since 1999.\textsuperscript{198} Most of the bills mirror parts, all, or combinations of the federal bills discussed above. To determine the strength of each law, six important questions must be asked (See Figure 9):

- Does the law include mandatory data collection?
- Does it explicitly prohibit the practice of racial profiling?
- How is racial profiling defined?
- Does it require police training about racial profiling?
- What sort of penalties are assessed for failure to comply with the act?
- Does it apply to all police within the state, or just state police?

Furthermore, as I survey the legislation, I would pose several questions that arose in Chapter 1 about motive and action and in Chapter 3 about costs and benefits, namely:

- Does the law aim to address institutional causes or individual motives?
- Does it focus on influencing motives or penalizing actions?
- What are the expected benefits of the law?
- What kinds of costs does it entail?

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<td>Fla.</td>
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Figure 9. State Legislation

I will begin with the first set of questions, which pertain to the characteristics of the statutes themselves. (See Figure 9.) Fourteen of the 19 laws explicitly require data collection by police officers, and most of them require the same data categories as called for in TSSSA. The state attorney general or other figure is generally required to submit a regular report based on the statistics gathered. Some bills merely call for the data to be reported directly, whereas others call for statistical experts to interpret the results of the data collection.


199 In addition to the 14 states in which data collection is required by statute, some police agencies are collecting data under federal supervision and many others do so voluntarily. See Montgomery, supra note 30.
Fourteen of the 19 laws also “prohibit” the practice of racial profiling, though they vary widely in their definitions of racial profiling. Several definitions seem to be in use. Certain laws define racial profiling as stopping motorists “solely” based on their race, which is a very narrow definition since a police officer would need only one additional reason, such as age or a broken taillight, in order to be excluded from the definition. Less narrow definitions include making stops “based on race” and “motivated by race.” The strongest, or most inclusive, definitions include “pretext” stops, “disparate treatment,” and using race “as a factor.” One puzzling definition, stopping motorists based on “a broad set of criteria which casts suspicion on an entire class of people,” is used in two states.

About half the statutes include some form of racial profiling training or retraining for officers, though these mandates vary widely. Some statutes require all police officers to attend a class or watch a video, while others only require the training for new officers.

Only seven states have penalties for non-compliance. They range from withholding state funds from police departments that either do not collect data or do not address racial profiling problems to individual penalties against police officers who are shown to practice racial profiling. Only one bill creates a private right of legal action, and that applies only to police agencies that fail to collect data. Overall, there seem to be few enforcement mechanisms in the laws.

Finally, five of the laws are weakened by their failure to require all police agencies in the state to comply; some are only directed at the state-level police force.
In two of the states, only large counties are required to collect data. In others, local data collection is voluntary, but if data is collected then it must be reported to the state attorney general.

Now that I have reviewed the contents of these statutes, I turn to evaluating them. This requires identifying which problems they address - which motives and which actions - as well as their costs and benefits. In Chapter 1, I discussed several motivating factors for racial profiling: institutional policies, individual racial animus, unconscious racism, pretext, and stops based partly but not wholly on race. I also listed a range of actions associated with profiling: violence, searches, ticketing, rudeness, and harassment.

A review of the legislation reveals that different bills target different aspects (motives, actions) of the racial profiling problem; none addresses all the relevant motives and actions. First, the various definitions of racial profiling in the state statutes reflect attempts to target motives and actions to different degrees: the “solely based on race” definition aims to stop the blatantly racist cop, the “pretext” definition recognizes the problem with pretext motives and the search action associated with it, and the laws which do not prohibit the practice at all seem to ignore the problem of institutionally generated racial profiling policies.

Which motives or actions do the police training provisions target? Training is designed both to prevent a de facto policy of profiling and to address officers’ unconscious biases by making them more aware of the need to avoid profiling. Penalties that withhold funding from agencies address the institutional motives,
whereas penalties against individual officers are designed for the “bad apples” on the police force and their more egregious actions.

Data collection requirements, the legacy of the Conyers bill, is also designed to address the actions associated with profiling. Statistical studies, as shown in the previous chapter, aim to uncover unjustified searching, ticketing, and non-ticketed harassment stops. While they do not reflect the intentions and motives of the police, they can provide a picture of what actions they take.

Like the federal legislation, the state laws have clear weaknesses when subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. It is difficult to know what sort of benefits the statutes might generate, but a review of the bills’ provisions yields mostly skepticism. “Bans” on racial profiling, for example, are sure to eliminate official, written policies endorsing the practice, but it is difficult to enforce such a ban against unwritten institutional practices, let alone individual activities. This is especially true of the bills in which (a) penalties are either light, vague or non-existent, and (b) the definition of racial profiling is so narrow as to permit all but the most blatant practices. Furthermore, data collection might highlight trouble spots where racial profiling is occurring, but data collection alone cannot prevent or remedy the problem. In fact, limited attempts at data collection so far have encountered a host of stumbling blocks, such as continual disagreement over the correct interpretation of the data.²⁰⁰

As for the costs involved, police officers have complained that taking the time to fill out long, detailed forms for every traffic stop they make compromises their ability to do their jobs effectively. Establishing a data collection system can be financially burdensome as well, costing anywhere from $10,000 to $130,000 per department. Training programs are even more expensive and can demand over $1 million. Needless to say, these costs can be discouraging if there is no promise that racial profiling will actually diminish as a result of these reforms.

Consider the racial profiling law from one state, Missouri, to see precisely why legislation has been weak in this area. Missouri’s Senate Bill 1053, enacted in June 2000, has been widely acclaimed as the strongest racial profiling law yet. Therefore, it is probably safe to say that the state racial profiling statutes in general will possess many of the weaknesses, if not more, that plague the Missouri bill. Bill 1053 requires all police officers in the state to collect traffic stop data similar to that required by the Conyers bill. The state attorney general must analyze the data and compile an annual report, which must include a “comparison of the percentage of stopped motor vehicles driven by each minority group and the percentage of the state's population that each minority group comprises.” The bill also requires all police agencies to

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201 Ramirez, supra note 200 at 14.
202 Id. at 20, 34.
203 Id. at 34-35.
207 Id.
develop policies prohibiting racial profiling, defined as “the practice of routinely stopping members of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws as a pretext for investigating other violations of criminal law.”\textsuperscript{208} Furthermore, police agencies must review the traffic stop records of individual officers for patterns of racially disproportionate traffic stops, determine if those officers are engaging in pretext-based racial profiling, and provide “appropriate counseling and training” to such officers.\textsuperscript{209} If a police department does not comply, then the governor is authorized by the law to withhold state funds from that agency.\textsuperscript{210}

Missouri bill 1053 contains all the “strong” provisions listed in Figure 9: it requires comprehensive data collection, it prohibits racial profiling, it uses a strong “pretext” definition, it requires some officer training, it penalizes non-compliant agencies by withholding funds, and it applies to all police officers in the state. Furthermore, it aims both to address institutional causes (by requiring all agencies to develop anti-racial profiling policies) and individual motives (by singling out individual officers based on patterns in their traffic stop data). The bill also works to eliminate motives (by using a pretext-based definition of racial profiling) as well as penalize actions (by withdrawing funds and requiring remedial officer training). Relative to the other state laws, most of which either include fewer provisions or weaker definitions and penalties, Missouri’s bill appears comprehensive and strong.

\textsuperscript{208} Id., emphasis added.  
\textsuperscript{209} Id.  
\textsuperscript{210} Id.
Its relative strength notwithstanding, however, bill 1053 is more symbolic than substantive. Even though it requires comprehensive data collection, it has weak provisions for analyzing and interpreting the data. The attorney general’s report must compare the racial proportions of traffic stops to the racial proportions in overall state population, but this is a crude way to analyze racial data; it does not take into account racial proportions in local areas, car ownership, or driving patterns, to name a few problems.\(^{211}\) Furthermore, the bill requires remedial training for officers whose traffic stop data reveal a racially disproportionate pattern and who are found to engage in pretext stops, but it does not describe how pretext-stop profiling could be shown independent of racially disproportionate traffic stop data. Even if officers do receive remedial training, the statute does not provide for further disciplinary penalties if racial profiling continues. While the governor is authorized to withdraw state funds from police agencies that do not comply with the law, any police agency can still claim to be in compliance with the statute as long as it develops anti-racial profiling policies and provides training for problem officers - regardless of whether the racial profiling continues. More importantly, the withdrawal-of-funds provision leaves such action to the discretion of the governor, and defunding law enforcement is extremely rare and politically suicidal. So while the Missouri bill appears to be the strongest of all racial profiling legislation to date, one cannot help but be skeptical about its power to affect racial profiling in that state. Furthermore, most of the other state bills are even weaker.

\(^{211}\) See Ramirez, supra note 200; and Harris, When Success Breeds Attack, supra note 32.
Why has there been such a flurry of legislation if most of the laws are relatively weak and ineffective? I have already suggested that the Conyers bill at the federal level has served as a model and catalyst for similar bills at the level of state legislatures. But even these state laws seem primarily dedicated to making a statement against racial profiling rather than actually eliminating the problem. In Congress The Electoral Connection, David R. Mayhew suggests that this is to be expected of legislation about high-profile issues. It is the chief goal of every legislator to be reelected, and so given the average voter's lack of interest in and knowledge of the details of public policy, much of the legislation comes out looking more symbolic than substantive:

The term symbolic can ... usefully be applied where [the legislature] prescribes policy effects but does not act (in legislating or overseeing or both) so as to achieve them.... The reason, of course, is that in a large class of legislative undertakings the electoral payment is for positions rather than for effects. 212

That way, legislators are able to return to their home districts as "credit claimers" 213 and "position takers" 214 with respect to the statute on racial profiling, even though the effects of the legislation may be negligible or even costly. Similarly, R. Kent Weaver argues in "The Politics of Blame Avoidance" that even if legislators cannot or do not wish to claim credit for certain activities, they will jump on the bandwagon of non-ideal legislation in order to avoid being blamed for inaction in future elections. 215 As self-interested politicians, then, policy-makers are bound to pass laws that speak out against racial profiling even if they do not take dramatic steps toward implementation.

213 Id. at 52-61.
214 Id. at 61-73.
The importance of implementation should not be dismissed, but neither should it be overemphasized. The typical legislative analysis does not take into account all the effects, both direct and indirect, of legislation against racial profiling. Just as the Conyers bill (TSSSA) had no direct impact on racial profiling but indirectly generated public awareness, executive action, and legislation on the state level, state legislation can have an indirect effect on police activity even when its direct effects are difficult to measure.

Even when a state law is unable to send a powerful mandate, it can send a powerful message. Collecting and publishing traffic stop data sends the message that racially disproportionate traffic stops will be discovered and deemed unacceptable by the public, as well as embarrassing to law enforcement officials. Moreover, policies banning racial profiling, even if difficult to enforce on an individual basis, send the message that racial profiling cannot be justified in a moral sense, and that our political system values racial fairness over cold efficiency in law enforcement. While it is nearly impossible to force some people to change their mind about questions of race, fairness and justice, it is not meaningless to set a tone, publicly and collectively, in favor of certain principles.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

A review of federal and state racial profiling legislation in this chapter has revealed a body of public policy more symbolic than substantive, sending strong messages but weak mandates, and more concerned with codification than implementation. Previously, I argued that the courts were even less willing to take action on racial profiling, all but excluding its victims from constitutional protection and by and large leaving the matter to Congress or the states. In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly consider some alternative policy proposals that may be more effective than the judicial doctrine and legislation that already exists.

Some believe that the best solution to racial profiling can still be found in the courts. One law review article states that the Supreme Court should revise its holding in Whren v. United States so as to employ Fourteenth Amendment protections in Fourth Amendment cases.216 Others have urged the Supreme Court to reverse Whren altogether.217 While these proposals may have some merit in theory, it is unreasonable to expect that the Supreme Court will overturn a 9-0 decision anytime soon. Even on matters not directly related to Whren, the Court has shown itself unwilling to become deeply involved in a debate over racial profiling.

A number of opponents of racial profiling have also claimed that the legislative activities reviewed in this chapter represent a solid step toward the elimination of racial profiling. The ACLU, for instance, has lobbied strongly in favor of TSSSA as

216 Trende, supra note 16 at 367-71.
217 Harris, Car Wars, supra note 110 at 585. Rudovsky, supra note 85 at 365.
well as state legislation requiring mandatory data collection on traffic stops. When the Missouri legislature passed that state’s Bill 1053 in May 2000, the executive director of the ACLU of Eastern Missouri proclaimed, “Data collection is the best way to document the problem of racial profiling and will ultimately allow us to work to end this practice.” Still, data collection and state legislation have thus far proved frustrating to civil liberties advocates. None of the statutes has demonstrated or led to any consensus on how traffic stop data are appropriately interpreted once collected, and the data alone are of dubious value in court. While I have argued that these laws have a symbolic component sending a message against racial profiling, it should also be clear that symbolism alone will not suffice to eliminate racial profiling. In fact, symbolic legislation may even have the unintended effect of creating the illusion that a problem is being addressed when in fact it is not. In short, it is difficult to find a correlation, in fact or in theory, between the collection of traffic stop data and a significant reduction in racial profiling activity.

I therefore offer two legislative proposals that merit strong consideration by those who would take action against racial profiling. The first is a ban or moratorium on consent searches during traffic stops, and the second is an exclusionary rule for the violation of standard operation procedures. Both polices would target the “motive” and “action” components of racial profiling discussed in Chapter 1. It is unclear how

218 See ACLU Report, supra note 12.
large the costs and benefits of these proposals would be, but each proposal could be
subject to an experimental trial run in order to determine the trade-offs involved.

I will begin with the first proposal, a ban or moratorium on consent searches. Consent searches represent the majority of searches during traffic stops, because while a police officer needs “probable cause” to search a car without a warrant, the probable cause standard does not apply if a driver gives the officer permission to conduct a search. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already ruled that drivers who consent to a search does not have to be informed by the police of their right to refuse. As a result, police may make a pretext stop for a minor traffic violation, request consent for a vehicle search, and then arrest the driver if contraband is discovered during the search. Therefore, if police were stripped of the ability to conduct consent searches, then racial profiling could be significantly diminished. Police would need objective evidence (probable cause) of illegal activity in order to search a car; knowing this, they would not be so disposed to conduct pretext stops of minority drivers with the intention of carrying out a consent search.

The notion that putting an end to consent searches could seriously reduce racial profiling is not new, to legal experts or to policy-makers. It has been officially recommended by the state senate committee investigating racial profiling in New Jersey, though neither the governor nor the legislature there has acted on the panel’s

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221 Ohio v. Robinette, supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
222 Colb, supra note 220.
recommendation. In California, though, a six month moratorium on consent searches was declared by the chief of the California Highway Patrol, though it was difficult to draw conclusions about the action’s effectiveness over so short a time period. Still, California’s action could serve as a model for other states. Governors can issue an executive order suspending consent searches by state police, and legislatures can mandate a consent search moratorium for all state and local police. If evidence of racial profiling diminishes but the police are still able to do their jobs effectively, then the moratorium could become a permanent ban; if not, other solutions must be sought.

The second proposal is an exclusionary rule for violations of standard operating procedures. An exclusionary rule is already standard doctrine in constitutional law for Fourth Amendment violations; if a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment then any contraband seized is inadmissible in court. In *Whren*, the Supreme Court ruled that pretext stops were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. But in the *Whren* case the police officers involved were not conforming to standard operating procedures, as defined by their police department’s guidelines, when they conducted

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225 See *Whren v. United States*, supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
the traffic stop. The officers in Whren conducted the pretext stop even though they were plainclothes officers and District of Columbia police regulations do not permit traffic stops by officers not in uniform unless the traffic violation “is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.” The Whren court ruled that by itself, failure to conform to local standard operating procedures did not amount to a constitutional violation.

Even if non-standard police activity is not in violation of the Constitution, state legislatures could mandate an exclusionary rule for evidence seized in this manner. Just as individualized protection under the Fourth Amendment would be severely weakened if illegally seized evidence were admissible in court, police officers would be much more likely to conform to standard procedures if they knew that any non-conforming activities would not yield successful stops, searches and arrests. While it seems unlikely, given the Whren decision, that courts will exclude such evidence on constitutional grounds, states may legislate an exclusionary rule for evidence seized under non-standard operating procedures. Again, such a law could begin as temporary and experimental. Given the circumstances of Whren and cases like it, a high probability exists that an exclusionary rule of this sort could cut down on racial profiling without placing serious burdens on police activity.

Not only do these proposals seem reasonable and modest in scope, they will impact both the “motive” and “action” elements of racial profiling I discussed in

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226 Whren, supra, at 815-816.
227 Id. at 815.
228 Id. at 816.
Suspending consent searches will target racial profiling actions, because officers are likely to make fewer unjustified stops, let alone searches, if they know probable cause is needed for a search. A consent search moratorium will also target motives, because insofar as institutional policies, explicit or implicit, currently support or encourage racial profiling, those policies will be curtailed by an official ban on consent searches. As for an exclusionary rule for violations of standard operating procedures, this will affect actions because the officers’ behavior in the Whren case and others like it is highly unlikely if police know that their evidence will not stand up in court. The exclusionary rule would impact motives for the same institutional reasons justifying the consent search ban. While these are modest proposals, they can potentially have significant effects on the extent and severity of racial profiling.

Summary

This paper has been an examination of the rise of racial profiling as a significant political issue, its place within a theoretical framework of cost-benefit analysis, and the activities of the courts and legislatures in addressing it. In Chapter 1, racial profiling was defined as the discriminatory treatment of minorities by law enforcement officials based on the belief that skin color is a predictor of criminal activity. In that chapter I set up a framework for discussion that included both a scope, limited to traffic stops by police on streets and highways, and a distinction between severity with respect to action and severity with respect to motive. I argued that racial profiling is a result of a number of possible motives, and leads to a number of possible actions.
Chapter 2 was an account of the recent history of racial profiling. While racial profiling has long been used by law enforcement officials, its current form can be traced to the so-called War on Drugs and its associated drug-interdiction efforts by federal, state and local police agencies. Racial profiling did not earn a significant place on the public agenda, however, until 1998 when two high-profile, race-related police shootings took place. Extending the severity of motive/action framework from the previous chapter, I argued that those severe actions led to a public examination of less severe actions and the motives behind them.

In Chapter 3, I set up a broader theoretical framework in order to justify a normative approach to the racial profiling issue. I proposed a cost-benefit analysis and examined the claims that there are legitimate benefits to racial profiling as well as significant costs. I concluded that efficiency in law enforcement is, in fact, a benefit of racial profiling, but that these benefits do not outweigh the need for individual fairness, the main cost of racial profiling.

Chapter 4 was a review and analysis of the role of the courts in this issue. Two constitutional provisions, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, are most central to the legal debate; but the federal judiciary has been reluctant to offer constitutional protection from racial profiling under these amendments. In fact, I argued, the motive/action distinction was illustrative in this area: where racial profiling evidence is strongest for motives and intent, the courts demand proof of bad actions; but where racial profiling evidence is strongest for actions and impact, the courts demand proof of bad motives and intent. The courts have indicated that it is up to lawmakers to take
action against racial profiling. As interpreters of the Constitution, federal courts have limited the extent to which racial profiling litigation can be successful; as policymakers, they have passed the buck to states and legislatures.

Legislative activities, then, were the topic of Chapter 5. Legislation against racial profiling has been introduced on the federal and state levels, but, I argued, the bills at both levels have been stronger as messages than as mandates. However, their symbolic value should not be dismissed: the federal bills, though never passed, have served as models for racial profiling legislation in the states; and the state bills, though lacking key enforcement and implementation mechanisms, condemn racial profiling in ways the judiciary chose not to. Still, symbolic legislation alone cannot put an end to racial profiling. Therefore, I proposed two policy alternatives at the end of Chapter 5: an end to consent searches, and an exclusionary rule for the violation of standard operating procedures. Drawing on the motive/action framework from Chapter 1, I argued that these proposals address both these components; and drawing on the theoretical framework from Chapter 3, I argued that the benefits to fairness of these proposals outweigh their costs to police efficiency.

It is most regrettable that the story cannot end here. The September 11 terrorist attacks significantly altered the context of the racial profiling debate. In the final chapter, an epilogue, I shall discuss racial profiling in the aftermath of September 11.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, opponents of racial profiling seemed to be making some progress. President Bush was scheduled to meet with the president of the American Muslim Council that afternoon to discuss racial profiling of Muslims and Arabs. In New Jersey, a two-day summit on racial profiling was just beginning, bringing together political, police and community leaders from that state. Of course, that summit abruptly ended, and the meeting with the President was cancelled, when terrorists flew hijacked aircraft into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The meeting and summit were cancelled out of respect for the gravity of that day’s events and because the political and law enforcement officials involved had a developing crisis on their hands. But the cancellation of these events was also deeply symbolic of the effect of September 11 on racial profiling, for the issue took on a new meaning after the terrorist attacks.

In this final chapter, an epilogue, I will briefly discuss the impact of the September 11 attacks on the racial profiling debate. The momentum behind new legislation has been lost, and the public has abandoned its moral certainty on the issue. Using the theoretical framework from Chapter 3, I will argue that there are important distinctions between racially profiling terrorists and racially profiling drug traffickers, but that a cost-benefit approach to post-September 11 security is still the most reasonable.

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In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a number of events suggested that racial profiling would play a prominent role in increased security. Because all 19 of the September 11 hijackers were men of Middle Eastern descent, officials investigating the attacks and guarding against future terrorism focused their energies on Middle Eastern men. The U.S. Justice Department asked local police departments to interview about 5,000 Middle Eastern men about any knowledge they might have of terrorist activities, and several police departments expressed concern over racial profiling. Several men from the Middle East complained they were kicked off airplanes solely because of their appearance. Even one of President Bush’s Secret Service agents, who is Arab-American, said he was removed from an airplane because of racial profiling. Rep. Conyers and Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.), both of whom have sponsored federal legislation against racial profiling, wrote an open letter to several airlines asking them not to racially profile their customers in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Many other political figures, though, were not interested in taking a stand against racial profiling. In New Jersey, where racial profiling has been in the headlines on a regular basis, the attorney general warned in September that the police may stop

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people who appear to be Middle Eastern so that they can be questioned about terrorism. His comments were met with opposition from the Arab-American community and the ACLU, but few others complained.

The New Jersey attorney general was not alone; others' comments suggested that it was now politically acceptable to support racial profiling. In October, a candidate for Congress announced that he would support racial profiling of Arabs in the fight against terrorism. In February, the governor of Oklahoma said that airlines should react suspiciously to passengers “speaking Arabic or reading the Koran or praying.”

Recall that before September 11, the New Jersey state police superintendent was fired for comments supportive of racial profiling, and political leaders in both parties condemned it. But after the terrorist attacks, the political climate had changed: such comments could again be uttered with political impunity.

The September 11 attacks put the brakes on the trend toward legislation against racial profiling. Bills in several states were defeated or not brought to a vote, mostly because the momentum and public support for such legislation had been lost. In Washington, Rep. Marge Roukema (R-N.J.) said that “it’s certainly not appropriate to

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be taking it under consideration” because “you’re going to be putting unnecessary obstacles in the way of [police officers’] enforcement of the law.”

In the courts, too, September 11 has weakened opposition to racial profiling. The New Jersey troopers accused of shooting unarmed black men on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1998, “the case that got the nation talking about racial profiling,” were awaiting trial at the time of the terrorist attacks. When they struck an extremely favorable plea bargain in January 2002 – they each paid a $280 fine and retired from the police force – they were widely thought to have benefited from the new political environment in which racial profiling was no longer forbidden.

Public opinion polls indicate that a significant proportion of the public has done an about-face on this issue. Recall that after the New Jersey Turnpike and Amadou Diallo shootings, a majority of the public thought that racial profiling was widespread, and over 80% believed it was wrong. But after the terrorist attacks, a Gallup poll showed that 58% of Americans supported “more intensive security checks for Arabs” and in a Los Angeles Times poll 68% said they would support police “randomly stopping people who may fit the profile of suspected terrorists.” According to a Washington Post/ABC News poll, 73% said that the government was

242 Id.
243 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
doing enough to protect the rights of Arab Americans, and 66% said they would be willing to give up some liberties for the sake of the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{246} When asked generally about racial profiling, only 43% of Americans were willing to condemn it; 45% supported the statement, “Law enforcement officials must use whatever actions necessary to stop crime and protect American citizens.”\textsuperscript{247}

Even African Americans, long the victims of racial profiling, said they supported the practice after September 11. In a recent Gallup poll, 71% of African Americans supported racial profiling of Arabs.\textsuperscript{248} Over 60% of African Americans said the government was doing enough to protect the rights of Arab Americans, and 71% said they would give up some civil liberties for the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{249}

The polls, however, do not fully capture the mindset of those who reconsidered racial profiling after September 11. When they were asked open-ended questions about their views, ordinary Americans would say things like, “It’s not right ... but it’s justified,”\textsuperscript{250} and “It might be wrong, but they’ve got to do it.”\textsuperscript{251} In reconsidering their moral certainty about racial profiling, these individuals encountered some moral confusion: on the one hand, they think racial profiling is wrong, because they would have said as much a year ago; while on the other hand, it seems to make more sense to

\textsuperscript{248} Democratic Leadership Council poll, conducted Nov. 21, 2001, Lexis-Nexis Question ID USPEN N.02D LCJF.
\textsuperscript{250} Howe Verhovek, supra note 244.
them now that there is a terrorist threat. But they are somehow able to reconcile these conflicting opinions, because they believe that sometimes actions are justified even when they are morally wrong.

Though I would not choose to express these feelings in those terms, I believe these responses are on to something. They reflect a true sense of moral conflict between freedom and security during crisis in a liberal democracy. But the moral conflict is nothing more than an exacerbation of the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3. That framework consisted of a cost-benefit analysis in which police efficiency was the benefit of racial profiling and fairness to individuals the cost; in that case, I argued, the cost outweighed the benefit. After September 11, however, many Americans seem to be reconsidering that, and understandably so. Before, the benefit of racial profiling was no greater than a slight reduction in crime or a slightly higher yield in drug interdiction. In the aftermath of September 11, though, the potential benefit is viewed as far greater: the prevention of terrorism, saving hundreds or even thousands of lives. So it is no wonder that people have changed their opinions about racial profiling. That they are using the same framework can be inferred from their confusing quotes like “It’s not right, but it’s justified.” Now, instead of the costs of racial profiling outweighing the benefits, they believe that the benefits outweigh the costs.

This point of view is also reflected in much of the political commentary about racial profiling since September 11. One writer in The National Review suggests that it

is not hypocritical of African Americans to condemn racial profiling in the war on drugs but support it in the war on terrorism because we should consider three questions: “How important is the objective that the profile seeks to accomplish? How effective is the profile in advancing that objective? What is the potential for abuse?” Since, in the writer’s judgment, all three answers come out favorably for profiling terrorists and unfavorably for profiling drug traffickers, it is no contradiction to support the former but condemn the latter. In The Los Angeles Times, a Yale law professor, noting that “context is everything,” proposed a similar set of questions:

- How serious is the crime risk? How do we assess the relative costs of false positives and false negatives? How accurate is the stereotype?
- How practicable is it to pursue the facts through an individualized inquiry rather than through stereotypes? If we must use stereotypes, do some rely on less incendiary and objectionable factors?

Lastly, in another National Review article, a constitutional lawyer noted that even in cases of racial discrimination by the government, Fourteenth Amendment doctrine permits “narrowly tailored” discrimination to further “a compelling governmental interest.” He then goes on to state: “If stopping terrorism is not a compelling interest, then nothing is.” All of these writers have somewhat different points, but they reach similar conclusions based on a cost-benefit mechanism like the one discussed in Chapter 3.

252 Levy, supra note 248.
253 Id.
256 Id.
These writers are correct to use a cost-benefit framework to analyze racial profiling in the aftermath of September 11, and they are correct that racially profiling terrorists is not the same as racially profiling drug traffickers. However, they are too quick to conclude that the benefits of profiling necessarily outweigh the costs. They mistakenly assume that racially profiling Arab Americans does, in fact, significantly increase the chances of stopping a terrorist; and they err in assessing the possibility of terrorism so great an evil that virtually any benefit to law enforcement, no matter how slight, outweighs the significant fairness costs of racial profiling.

I do not wish to reach a definitive conclusion about this question here, but I do propose that these costs and benefits be deliberated, not assumed. There is no evidence to date that racially profiling Middle Easterners has actually resulted in the capture of any terrorists or the prevention of any terrorism, nor is there any evidence that racial profiling will yield this sort of benefit in the future. Unlike the argument for efficiency in law enforcement, which seems to have some merit, racial profiling for terrorism seems to rely solely on the intuitive notion that singling out Arabs for suspicion will somehow diminish the chances that terrorism will recur. In fact, racial profiling can lead to deterioration between law enforcement and the Arab-American community, which in turn could lessen the chance that a law-abiding member of that community would tip off police to suspicious behavior. Over a long period of time, culturally embedded racial profiling can have the effect of creating second-class citizens. Can we risk doing that, and still declare victory in a war on terrorism? The
competing demands of national security and liberal democracy in the aftermath of September 11 leave us with few easy answers.
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