Megan MacDowell

E.S. Capstone Seminar

Paper for 2/24/99

 

Lessons from a Third World perspective on environmentalism

 

Possibly more than any of the other articles we have read so far,

Ramachandra Guha's article "Radical Environmentalism and Wilderness

Preservation: A Third World Critique" made me think. In analyzing the

Western deep ecology movement, he criticized its focus on preservation of

wild areas. By doing this, he was directly criticizing what I have long

thought of as my main goal as an "environmentalist." One of the first

things that turned me on to environmental issues when I was younger was my

horror at the soaring rate of rainforest destruction so dramatically

portrayed to us in 9th grade biology class. Since then, by following a

biology track through college, my focus has been on ecological goals such

as the preservation of biodiversity. The study of ecology has served me as

a way to understand wilderness so I might be able to help protect it or

restore it. My patterns of thought are often not far off from those of

Daniel Janzen, which Guha quotes in his paper as "imperialist yearning of

Western biologists and their financial sponsors" to claim land in Third

World countries for protection by ecologists (Guha 272). He states his

opinion that "the radical conclusions drawn by deep ecology, in particular,

that intervention in nature should be guided primarily by the need to

preserve biotic integrity rather than by the needs of humans" are

unacceptable (271). He also claims that the two "fundamental ecological

problems facing the globe are (i) overconsumption by the industrialized

world and by urban elites in the Third World and (ii) growing

militarization" (271), whereas the biological perspective would claim more

direct causes of threat to biodiversity such as habitat loss and pollution.

Clearly, we tend towards opposite ends of the spectrum of environmentalism

- him from the social perspective and I from the ecological

preservationist's perspective. But reading the article, I was struck by

what we can learn from each other and from where we overlap.

Guha's article critiqued the four main tenants of deep ecology

(which are, as he sees them,: a shift from anthropocentric to biocentric

ethics, a focus on preservation of wilderness, an invocation of Eastern

spiritual traditions, and a perception of being the vanguard of current

environmentalism) in order to show that, as is, deep ecology would only

meet its goals at the expense of the Third World. He gave the example of

"Project Tiger" in India, in which Western preservationists organizations

encouraged the designation of a network of parks to preserve the tiger's

habitat but only by moving whole villages of people and prohibiting them

from using the land (272). Of course, this type of conflict between

protecting the habitat of an endangered species and letting the land be

used by locals does not only occur in Third World contexts - it is a common

debate, including of course the famous Spotted Owl example within our own

country.

Although it seems clear that a conflict between anthropocentric and

biocentric world views is at work here, Guha claims that the dichotomy is

useless (271). I have also seen it as somewhat problematic, even from my

own biological perspective. Humans of course are members of their

ecosystems and not "above" other life forms, but at the same time, because

we are part of the natural world, just as all other species, we focus on

our own self interests. But because other chapters deal with this topic

more in depth, I will not discuss it here. Nor will I discuss the extent

to which deep ecology is born from Eastern religions because, as he states

himself, it is mainly a historical rather than philosophical argument.

Instead, I was most interested in his analysis of deep ecology as being

"uniquely American" (270).

Guha argues that the deep ecology movement is "firmly rooted in

American environmental and cultural history and is inappropriate when

applied to the Third World" (270), meaning that there is not a similar

focus on preservation and biocentrism outside of America, and thus our

imposing these values on the Third World is imperialistic and exploitative.

>From several of the readings for this week, it was clear that non-Western

societies mostly lived in sustainable ways until the arrival of Western

values of consumerism, industrialization and growth (ex- see Dwivedi 248,

Ogungbemi 263). These value systems lead to environmental damage, yet

before these countries develop enough to feed themselves through this

system, the West now sends them demands to leave parts of their land

untouched as preserves. Yet because of their struggle for growth, land set

aside will most likely take the limited resources away from the poor.

Thus I can see how deep ecology could only come from a wealthy

nation. Only where we are not currently battling for food or survival can

ideas such as denying anthropocentrism arise. Of course I learned about

environmental issues in a very different way than someone in a Third World

nation who suffers from scarcity of resources for his own survival. Also,

because we are wealthy enough to be worried about issues such as how to

spend our leisure time, we are concerned with creating parks for aesthetic

reasons as well as for preservation of the other life forms. I can see how

the Third World would be unreceptive to deep ecology, but I unfortunately

also see how this is mainly the fault of the spread from the West of

materialism and thus widening division of wealth. Guha argues, "Deep

ecology runs parallel to the consumer society without seriously questioning

its ecological and sociopolitical basis" (273-4), and although it seems

from some of our previous readings that that was not its intention (ex -

Naess 134), deep ecology does not satisfactorily address these issues.

In general, Guha's article did a good job at reminding me that

"environmentalism" is thought of in very different ways in different parts

of the world. Even within the U.S. there is the preservationists vs.

utilitarian dichotomy, but this difference is much more extreme when

comparing the First World and Third World. Guha sees deep ecology as "an

unflinching opposition to human attacks on undisturbed wilderness" (270),

and thus in opposition to environmental movements such as social ecology

that encourage sustainable use, but not preservation per se. In the end,

to him humans are more important than biodiversity.

From reading his article I can at least learn what is missing from

my own viewpoint - or at least understand better where it came from and

what effects it might have on people in the Third World. I can see how

deep ecology is a very necessarily American philosophy, and how it could be

born in reaction to problems within our society, but it is also a child of

our society's wealth. I see I can not focus on preservationist goals in

other countries in a vacuum - I must take into account humans as a part of

the landscape - and they deserve for their rights to be respected, not just

the endangered species. But the strongest message I got from the article

is something we see in common - the general need for a new sort of humility

in our actions as humans, especially in the West where we are in charge of

more resources and thus could make much larger scale environmental changes.

 

Guha says it well: "The expansionist character of modern Western

man will have to give way to an ethic of renunciation and self-limitation"

(274). Our use of an overwhelming proportion of the world's resources and

our "advanced technologies" make us the most able to harm the environment.

But the value our culture places on the ideas of "growth" and "development"

(ask an economist) is the ultimate cause. Only a cultural change

emphasizing a new humility can change this. He even agrees with a

biocentric world view to some extent for just that reason - "Insofar as it

has begun to act as a check on man's arrogance and ecological hubris, the

transition from an anthropocentric to a biocentric view in both religious

and scientific traditions is only to be welcomed" (271). Perhaps this can

be achieved through a new environmental ethic, perhaps through religion.

One element of humility that Guha did not mention but is needed is

some sort of limit on our population growth. We have already almost

completely covered the globe with our species - it is no wonder that we are

causing such damage to the planet and to ourselves. Our species must be

humble enough to learn how to control its own numbers.

In a trend towards humility, we (as the West) are responsible for

beginning within ourselves and our institutions - not just because we serve

as a model for many Third World countries, but because we CAN. We are not

going hungry and we are the wealthy of the world. Now, this seems a

strange thing to ask to any species, especially because our "success" as a

species is specifically due to our drive to grow and alter our environment

to suit our needs - but that is why we have the power to reflect and the

ability to change our patterns.

Finally, I was impressed by Guha's description (albeit short) of

the perspective of the German Greens party as an example of a political

entity embodying such a humbleness (274). From what he says, the Greens

advocate a "no growth" economy "to be achieved by scaling down current (and

clearly unsustainable) consumption levels" (274). It sounded like the

right idea, but because I knew very little about how their success has

been, I researched the Greens a bit extra. On the web, I found a one page

listing more of the "Core Values" of the Greens. To list a few:

--"Basic human needs should be met first: food, shelter. clothing, heath

and education for all the world's peoples"

--"We should work for world peace rather than prepare for war"

--"All land belongs to the community occupying it, never to individuals"

--focus on human fulfillment and spiritual growth instead of material wealth

--"The values of caring, cooperation, nurturing and sharing must be

encouraged to replace the values of competitiveness, domination and

aggression which have characterized our society for so long"

--polices must reflect "the interdependence of all living things and the

interconnetedness of all political and social activity"

(http://www.greenparty.org.uk/principles/values/htm)

 

The list was impressive. And although the Greens seem more prevalent in

Europe than in the U.S. - there is an American Greens party - which had

Ralph Nader as their presidential candidate in 1996. Maybe the Greens

movement could help us meet a wide range of environmental and social goals

through its philosophy of humility, instead of following deep ecology's

biocentric proposal. I am encouraged to look further into it...