The Faith of a Physicist

People in Polkinghorne's position intrigue me greatly. I had believed that to believe in the paradigm of physics was to reject religion. However, the author has made a career of both. Furthermore, he has received more education life experience than myself. What could I possibly see that he does not see? I wish to understand how we can believe such different things when looking at mostly the same information and from a similar science-oriented perspective.

Polkinghorne speaks at length of how he is a "bottom-up thinker." By this, he means his beliefs are based upon experience of the world. His scientific beliefs are drawn from experimental data. Analogously, his religious faith is drawn from certain "religious experiences." I think the "bottom-up" language is rather unhelpful, since even scientific data cannot help but be interpreted through the lens of existing theory. However, this comparison of science and religion is the focus of the first of two places where the author and I disagree.

I have trouble with the notion of "religious experience." Polkinghorne does not offer a definition, but hints at several examples. He seems to equate the idea with matters of feeling: finding meaning in a piece of music, being motivated by conscience, etc. I do not dispute the fact that everyone has such feelings. However, I do not see how they are related to religion. Are not the processes of moral motivation and artistic perceptions rooted in psychology and neuroscience? I do not understand how a fact about a natural system can be taken as evidence for the existence of an incomprehensible God.

The author briefly addresses this argument, but not to the depth I was hoping for. Polkinghorne states that when evidence is found that contradicts a theory, a judgement call has to be made. Either the theory is incorrect, or else the evidence is erroneous or has been misinterpreted. We both agree that at present, there is no satisfactory scientific explanation for consciousness, artistic interpretation, or moral motivation. Polkinghorne judges that the theory of materialism is in error. I however, judge that materialism need not be altered. It has proved so effective at understanding the nature of reality, which can be demonstrated by the success of high-technology. I expect that it is merely a matter of time before the pathways of the brain are mapped, and these "religious experiences" become comprehensible to neuroscience. I still do not understand why someone like the author, who has experienced first-hand the success of the materialistic paradigm, would suspect it to be inadequate in this case.

While the author has not convinced me of his opinion, he has helped me to develop my own. I know the specific points of contention between our ways of thinking. Also, I appreciate how fragile that difference is. We have made a judgement call in a choice for which we will never have satisfactory information. I am aware now that to belief materialism is in fact a judgement call, and not as self-evident as I had believed.