Ariel Kobylak

Comp. Exam

Question #9

02/15/02

Social sciences like economics and sociology often portray humans as essentially rational creatures. They may point to the complex decisions that people must navigate, or the ways in which they relate socially, politically, or economically. They may point to advances in various sectors of society. Indeed, it is difficult to look around at the amazing accomplishments of so many women and men over the years, and yet still say that humans are irrational. Yet this is just what certain areas of psychology will (and do) argue -- that humans are much more irrational than some fields would have us believe.

Below, I will take a look at two such fields -- psychoanalytic theory and cognitive theories of reasoning and decision making -- in order to weigh the merits of this argument against the essential rationality of humans. I will argue that these two fields make strong arguments for certain irrationalities in humans. However, they do not claim that people are never rational. Each has its own explanation for when, how, and why people act and think irrationally.

Before we can begin to discuss either of the previously mentioned fields of study, we must take a moment to define the term "irrational". This is more than likely easier said than done. Any given discipline, be it psychoanalysis or economics, has a different definition of "rational" thoughts or behaviors, and therefore a different definition of what is "irrational" in comparison to these "rational" ways of being. Baron gives a definition of rational (as it relates to thinking) as "the kind of thinking we would all want to do, if we were aware of our own best interests, in order to achieve our goals" (Baron, 2000: 5). Rosenhan and Seligman (1995) imply that the "rational" in psychodynamic theory refers to behaviors that sufficiently take reality into account.

In the study of cognitive processes of decision making and probabalistic reasoning, there are three basic models to describe the ways in which people think and make decisions -- descriptive, normative, and prescriptive. Prescriptive models give information on how people should think or behave, and are often "rules of thumb" or simple heuristics. Normative models also impart information on how people ought to think, but they are different in that they take into account an individual's goals, and the best prescriptive model for achieving these goals. In a sense, normative models are ideals of thinking, although they are not always practical, in ways I will discuss further below (Baron, 2000).

Finally, we have descriptive models of thinking and deciding. These are the ways in which people actually make decisions, and they are often the products of prescriptive models mediating between actual behavior and normative ideals. This mediation is necessary, in part, because normative models may not always be rational. For example, the ideal (i.e. normative) way to go about making an important decision might be to make a list a pros and cons of the decision and every possible outcome of the decision, giving different weights to the former and probabilities to the latter, etc. While this approach would surely (eventually) give an individual the "best" decision, this is a moot point because the simple fact that this "ideal" process would take far too long makes it less than ideal. Indeed, this approach would be irrational in terms of achieving one's goals, because most people have a goal of not taking up all of their time making decisions (Baron, 2000).

So far, we have seen that the "ideal" way that people make decisions is often rational in theory but not in practice. However, when we look at descriptive models of thinking and deciding (which can be influenced by prescriptive models), we also see a host of mistakes that can be termed "irrational". For example, Eddy (1982), showed that many doctors make errors in calculating the probability of disease, by failing to take into account the base rates of certain diseases in the population or a group of patients. This is a serious concern, particularly given the fact that we generally hold doctors to a higher standard of knowledge than the common person.

Another example comes from Evans, Over, and Manktelow (1993), who discuss past studies in which subjects were asked to make inferences based on logic statements, or studies that used other reasoning tasks. These past studies argued that people were making a great deal of mistakes in reasoning (Wason is one well-known scholar in this area). The authors argue that rational reasoning is really of two types -- that which is influenced mainly by logic, and that which is influenced by an individual's goals. These two may be in conflict, and therefore, it is difficult to talk about one simple type of rationality (Evans, Over, and Manktelow, 1993). There are many other examples, aside from these few, of mistakes that individuals consistently make which could be deemed "irrational" (Baron, 2000).

These examples are considered irrational in that individuals are making systematic errors and not following certain rules (for example, of logic or probability). However, if we look at this irrationality based on the definition given before (in terms of people's goals), we get a more complex picture. In many cases, even though people are make errors, they are doing so because they are using mechanisms that usually serve to meet their goals. This brings us again to the point of Evans, et al. (1993), who argue that there is no one simple type of rationality.

It appears that there is a strong case for the irrationality of people in certain situations of reasoning and decision making. However, does this evidence mean that the criticism of this field of study is not warranted? This is a difficult question that comes mainly down to definitions of what is considered irrational. As Baron (2000) points out, a person can be thinking rational and yet make a bad decision, just as irrational decisions can ultimately turn out well. While some theorists have proven time and again that people are poor at certain reasoning tasks about logic and probability, I think there is something to be said for the criticism of these theorists stressing "irrational" processes that may indeed by quite rational, when viewed in the right context.

Like the study of cognitive processes of decision-making and probabilistic reasoning, psychoanalysis offers a three-tiered model to explain human behavior (via personality). The psychoanalytic concept of id, ego, and superego is very similar, in certain ways, to the idea of descriptive, normative, and prescriptive models of behavior. Indeed, each of these three-tiered models serves to emphasize, within its respective field, the potential for irrationality in people. The main difference between the two is that the psychoanalytic approach explains all of personality, while the cognitive approach only explains a particular aspect of it. For the present discussion, however, the two models are similar enough to justify comparison.

The three levels of personality work together in any given person, and often can be seen as working against each other. Of the three, only the ego can be seen as truly rational, because it is the only force that is concerned with reality (given our previous working definition of psychoanalytic rationality). The id is concerned with getting immediate gratification, and is often thought of as a biological process that is difficult to control, because it is often comprised of unconscious impulses (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

The superego is also portrayed as irrational, because it is essentially the "conscience" of the person, maintaining strict rules of conduct governed by broad notions of "right" and "wrong", created by family and/or society. While it is important for people to have notions of right and wrong, the superego does not take realities or practicalities into account when dictating a person's actions and thoughts, and may cause unnecessary guilt in an individual. Therefore, a rigidly moralistic person governed mainly by a superego would appear just as irrational as an id-driven child screaming, "Mine, mine, mine!" (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

The ego, or what is known as the "reality principle" (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995), is responsible for taking various factors of a person's life into account, and mediating between id and superego based on these. It is this force that could be considered "rational". However, the ego is constantly being pulled in conflicting directions, and is therefore not always able to function in a perfectly rational manner. In some cases, the id or superego may be strong enough to override the ego's attempts at rationality.

Another way in which psychoanalysis highlights the irrationality of people's behavior is with its notion of defense mechanisms. According to psychodynamic theory, whenever an individual is faced with any sort of conflict, s/he must find a way to deal with it. The coping strategies outlined by Freudians can be grouped by how "mature" they are -- that is, the degree to which they ignore or accept the reality of the situation. Given that our previous definition of Freudian "rationality" involved the degree to which a person was in touch with reality, we can say that many of the coping strategies available to people are irrational. For example, people may engage in dissociation, displacement, projection, or passive aggression in order to cope with a conflict. None of these reactions is uncommon, and all are irrational in various ways and degrees (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

Psychoanalysis may be deserving of some of the criticisms that have been leveled upon it over the years. However, it is unwarranted to suggest that the Freudian emphasis on the irrational is problematic. There is nothing in this theory to suggest that the majority of people are irrational all the time. Rather, this theory clearly spells out why irrationality may be fairly common, but it also makes clear the fact that there are many different degrees of irrationality, and that people have some control over how irrational they are.

The final question we are left with, then, is whether or not these definitions of "irrational" and the ways in which they are distinguished are satisfactory. I would argue that they are not, but that there is little that can be done about it. This is because of the basic problem of definition. It is difficult to say what is irrational in any given field, any given context, because definitions change as circumstances do. Trying to find common ground between multiple disciplines seems nearly impossible.

We have seen that psychoanalysis maintains a great number of instances in which irrationality is prevalent, and not just in "abnormal" people. I would argue, however, that this by no means suggests that people are never rational. To say that emphasizing irrationality necessarily means de-emphasizing rationality would itself be a mistake in logic, as evidenced in Baron's (2000) discussions of the tendency to people to misread statements of logic.

So, after all this, are people indeed rational? I think it is clear at this point that they are, in many ways. However, the level of rationality of any individual or group can only be measured in relation to the definition of rationality that one is using. Psychoanalysts and cognitive theorists argue that people make irrational decisions, judgments, and generally act in some irrational ways, but that these thoughts and actions are not random. Rather, they are predictable and (so the aforementioned theories argue) explainable. I would argue that the rational and irrational "camps" (for lack of a better word) are not as opposed (nor as polarized) as they would have us believe.

Ariel Kobylak

Comp. Exam

Question #10

02/15/02

From its beginnings, the study of psychology has been centered upon the dichotomy normal-abnormal. This dichotomy has been taken as a necessary part of many of the branches of psychology -- abnormal psychology being the most prevalent and obvious. Below, I will look at some of the arguments both for and against this dichotomy, focusing on information from the study of psychological disorder, as well as gender and sexual behavior studies. I will look primarily at abnormality in the sense of psychological disorder or impairment. Certainly we can speak of other fields of psychology where abnormality is discussed -- those who study individuals who learn abnormally or who acquire language in abnormal ways, for example. However, for the purposes of this discussion and for the sake of brevity, I will limit my scope to the more traditional "abnormal psychology" definition of normality and abnormality.

The consequences of either maintaining or rejecting this normal-abnormal dichotomy are each potentially very serious, and the merits and drawbacks of each should be considered, particularly given the fact that the lives and well-beings of real patients are at stake. First, it is necessary to look at a brief history of abnormality as a concept, and some of the reasons it has persisted for so many years.

On a very basic level, normality can be seen as simply the absence of abnormality. When an individual is seen as "abnormal", it usually means that s/he is suffering in some way (or causing others to suffer), is unable to function within the same society that others are involved in, has the potential for inflicting harm, or some or all of the above (among other things) (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995). Having categories of normal and abnormal may seem unavoidable. After all, it is necessary to adhere to (at least some) norms and standards in order to keep any society running smoothly. People, one could argue, are built to notice difference. However, the ways in which these differences are categorized and dealt with is not a simple matter.

An argument in favor of maintaining the normal-abnormal dichotomy is that it allows for a clear definition of psychological disorder. While this can be harmful (in ways I will discuss shortly), there is little doubt that much good has come out of it as well. By clearly placing some behaviors and ways of being in one category or the other, psychologists have been able to develop a concrete framework that they in turn can give to their clients. Many people may find comfort and relief in knowing that the problem they are having is not normal, in the course of everyday life -- which means that it has been classified and can be explained to them. More importantly, it can ultimately be solved.

Despite the fact that the normal-abnormal dichotomy has been useful in some ways for many years (and no doubt necessary), there are increasing arguments against it. As with any dichotomy its simplicity is appealing, yet it is also stiflingly limited. Below, I will examine some of the arguments against this overly simplistic idea, focusing on evidence from the field of psychological disorder, as well as gender studies and feminist theories.

First of all, there is the simple fact that it is extraordinarily difficult to set parameters for what is considered abnormal, or a disorder. Likewise, it is difficult for different people to agree on treatment. Both of these features of abnormality -- definition and treatment -- are by no means ever stable, and are always being revised and reworked. As "normality" changes, so do notions of abnormality. Rosenhan and Seligman (1995) point out that many "disorders" of the past would not be considered so today, or would be dealt with in very different ways. Therefore, it is a daunting task to be the person responsible for labeling any given person "normal" or "abnormal".

Another large problem with the normal-abnormal dichotomy is that it functions in a potentially harmful way when it is applied to certain groups (women, homosexuals, minorities) that are already considered somehow outside the bounds of "normality" as defined by the creators of much of psychological theory -- heterosexual white men. As Rosenhan and Seligman (1995) point out, women have long been looked upon as somehow abnormal or deviant, simply because of their sex (and the qualities thought to accompany it). This is also true for many minorities, who may engage in the same activities or commit the same crimes as whites, and yet be punished more severely than whites committing the same crimes or behaviors, or labeled as "deviant" (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

As for homosexuals, they were officially labeled as deviant by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for many years, and it is only fairly recently that this categorization was revised. Sexual practices have long been a controversial area in psychology, and there is still fierce debate about what should be considered within the bounds of normality. This debate is directly influenced by popular and even religious sentiment, and it is difficult for psychology as a field to look at sexual practice in a wholly objective light, given the enormous outside pressure to label certain practices "deviant" (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

In this context, then, certain groups are more likely than others to be labeled as "abnormal". This is a serious problem in a system that theoretically tries to maintain objective criteria that will allow anyone to be diagnosed as normal or abnormal, based on a pre-determined set of symptoms. We can look at one specific example of this bias in the case of female inmates. Despite the fact that women and men may commit some of the same crimes, come from the same backgrounds, and act in similar ways, there is no doubt that women in prisons are looked upon in very different manner than are men (Lloyd, 1995).

Lloyd (1995) refers to female inmates as "doubly damned" because they are already deviant in one sense (i.e. they are criminals, which is not something that society officially condones in anyone), but that they are also female criminals. Lloyd argues that criminal behavior, while not seen as normal for men in general, is nevertheless understood as a possibility, given the current, prevalent notions of masculinity. For women, however, criminal behavior makes them abnormal females and well as abnormal citizens, because they are acting outside the bounds of socially prescribed femininity. They are therefore treated in different ways than are comparable male criminals, and are more likely to be looked at as mentally deviant in some way, while the men are often labeled as more socially deviant (Lloyd, 1995). This is but one example of the ways in which men and women (or people of different social classes or sexual orientations) are treated differently based on prior cultural expectations, rather than by objective psychological criteria alone.

Many feminist theorists would agree that normality, as traditionally defined by heterosexual white men, is severely limited. For example, counselors who ascribe to feminist theories argue that many of their female clients are not abnormal, though counselors in other fields would see them that way. Rather, these feminist therapists argue, their clients are living in a male-dominated culture that discriminates against them, and their reactions to it are certainly normal, given their context (Sharf, 2000).

A final argument against the normal-abnormal dichotomy deals with the more political aspect of making such a distinction. The current definitions of abnormality (which we have already established are far from perfect) have a direct impact on who receives treatment, and of what sort, who is hospitalized, and whether or not it is against the individual's will. In the past, there have been numerous cases involving the mistreatment of individuals because they had earned the label "abnormal" -- whether we would say now that they deserved it or not (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

In a related vein, there is the fact that the definition of abnormality is not as scientific and unbiased in practice as it is in theory. This may be obvious at this point, but it bears repeating. For example, the fact that we now have strict definitions of various disorders may bias psychologists when they are making diagnoses. Some diagnoses are simply more "fashionable" than others, or are popular at one time or another for various reasons. Also, some definitions of "abnormal" are biased towards certain groups to begin with, as discussed earlier. This can cause more women than men, for example, to be diagnosed as abnormal in certain areas. Another problem is that a diagnosis of a certain disorder may serve more than the patient's best interest. In some cases, there is political or financial pressure of one sort or another on psychologists or psychiatrists to make certain diagnoses rather than others (Rosenhan and Seligman, 1995).

After all this, we can see that maintaining the normal-abnormal dichotomy is potentially harmful and problematic. Labeling individuals as anything other than normal can have profound effects on how they view themselves, and on how society sees them. However, to abandon the normal-abnormal dichotomy would mean a whole other set of problems and questions, and would indeed be a step back in some ways. The best choice, therefore, seems to be the approach that many psychologists are indeed taking, which involves some degree of revision of this dichotomy. Indeed, it may be a big step to simply admit the fact that a dichotomy is not the answer, but rather two points at the end of a spectrum. To view normality and abnormality by degrees rather than in absolutes may go a long way toward solving some of the problems that the dichotomy has presented in the past.

Ariel Kobylak

Comp. Exam

Question #15

Individuals must constantly mediate between themselves (their personal thoughts, feeling, emotions) and their interactions with other people. To some individuals one of these perspectives, be it relational or personal, may be more salient then the other. Even in one particular person, relationships may be more important in some aspects of life, while personal emotions and thoughts may be more relevant to others. Many areas of psychology have struggled with the question of what to focus on -- an intra-personal or interpersonal perspective -- and often are portrayed as being sharply split over this question.

It is indeed important to consider this question, as it has a direct impact on the treatment that patients receive. Below I will consider a specific example -- a woman suffering from depression -- and the different perspectives that various counselors might have on the problem as compared with adherents of the psychology of gender. By looking at one concrete, hypothetical case, I hope to shed some light on the ways in which many cases are looked at.

Depression is not an uncommon problem, particularly among women, and it is something that many counselors and clinical psychologists deal with regularly. However, within this area of psychology there are many different paths to treatment. Different theories of counseling view the individual differently, some focusing on the internal processes of the individual, some stressing the importance of relationships and relational processes. Gestalt and cognitive therapies, for example, focus primarily on internal processes within the individual. Family systems therapy, on the other hand, stresses the dynamics that exist within groups and between individuals. This type of therapy strives to improve these dynamics rather than simply trying to attend to each member of a group or pair as an autonomous unit. Feminist therapy (which I will examine in more detail shortly, in the context of the psychology of gender) is also concerned with the relations between people (Sharf, 2000).

Coming back to our example of the depressed woman, cognitive therapy would focus on her thoughts. A cognitive therapist would look for automatic thoughts that the woman may be unaware of, which might be the cause of some of her depression. Many individuals have self-defeating thoughts underlying their other thoughts and decisions. The woman in our example may have automatic thoughts about not being good at anything, or she may be telling herself that no one will ever like her. Cognitive therapists strive to bring this internal process to light, showing patients what they are thinking, and how they can change these automatic thoughts if they are damaging to the client (Sharf, 2000).

Cognitive therapists are also extremely interested in the cognitive distortions that individuals can engage in. Our patient may be overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, magnifying problems or minimizing positive events, or thinking dichotomously. There are many other examples of cognitive distortions, and cognitive therapists are concerned with rectifying these problems. A cognitive therapist would try to make our patient aware of any mistakes or distortions in her thinking, and develop ways for her to overcome these problems in reasoning (Sharf, 2000).

A Gestalt therapist would also focus on our patient's internal processes, although the fact that Gestalt is a practice concerned with the definition of boundaries would not preclude discussion of relationships with others. Gestalt is primarily focused on increasing a patient's awareness of her own body, thoughts, feelings, and sensations. Being aware of one's self as much as possible, and in as many ways as possible, is a key goal of Gestalt therapy. However, despite the focus on internal personal processes, Gestalt is also concerned with giving patients different perspectives with which to view the world, which can involve making them more aware of various aspects of their relationships with others (Sharf, 2000). This piece of Gestalt therapy keeps us from viewing it as a perfect model of the internal perspective.

In contrast to the previous two therapies, family systems therapy (as the name implies) is concerned with the relations between people, and how they effect the individuals as well as the group as a whole. Therapies of this type look at a larger picture than do other, more individual-oriented therapies. Family centered therapy might look at the background of the family (ethnic, religious, socioeconomic), the power dynamics between members, or the interaction of the family with a wider community. Therapies such as this believe that the best way to treat an individual and her/his concerns is by looking at as many aspects of that person's life as possible (Sharf, 2000).

The psychology of gender has long been concerned with relational processes between people, particularly between women and men, and relationships are generally stressed much more than internal processes. Some studies of gender, particularly early ones, were concerned with trying to pinpoint differences in the personalities and internal processes of men and women. However, these differences were always used in studying the interactions between the sexes.

Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1988) discuss this issue, and the ways in which it has been approached in the past. Essentially, those studying gender have tended to either overemphasize or underemphasize the differences between women and men. However, gender theorists are generally looking at these differences (or lack thereof) by comparing (and contrasting) women and men. The fact that these two groups are always interacting is an important piece of gender theory, and few theorists make references to men and women as entirely singular groups, without taking the other group into account (Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988).

The psychology of gender -- and feminist therapies in particular -- might look at our depressed patient in terms of her relations with others, especially men. Many feminists that study the psychology of gender today believe that, in the past, there have been many biases against women in the field of psychology. They also believe that Western society is still very much structured around a male "norm", which inherently discriminates against women. Also, these theorists believe that stereotypical male ways of being -- involving autonomy and reasoning -- have generally been valued more than female interactional and relational styles of behavior. These theorists argue that more attention needs to be drawn to the ways in which women act and construct their identities, often through their relationships with others (Sharf, 2000).

Getting back to our depressed patient example, gender theorists would not focus exclusively on internal cognitive processes or the patient's feelings about herself. Rather, a gender theorist would likely place her problems within a larger context, including her relationships with other people. This theorist would likely question the power dynamics in her relationships, particularly those with men, since women have often been placed in positions of less power relative to men. This theorist would also make it clear to our patient that she is not alone in troubles that she may be having as a women, and that forming healthy relationships with other women (depending on the patient's history) might be one way to help this patient recover. Gender theories that focus on feminism argue that women who are suffering may not be at fault as much as the society in which they live. Women should be encouraged to value relationships and question conformity to male-prescribed social norms (Sharf, 2000).

Given the present example, it seems as though the best approach would be one that attempts to use both relational and internal perspectives. Is this possible? I would argue that it is, and probably more so than some branches of psychology would have us believe. Freudian psychoanalysis is one good example of an area where the personal and relational perspectives are both used and judged to be (roughly) equally important. A psychoanalyst would examine internal conflicts that our depressed woman might be suffering from. She would also look at conflicts in the patient's relationships (particularly those with her parents). By looking at psychoanalysis as one example, we can see that relational and internal perspectives can indeed by reconciled in dealing with our fictional patient (Sharf, 2000).

A few fields of psychology may try to focus on only a single approach, even given the fact that it is often possible to utilize both. However, I would argue that it is not possible in any field to completely ignore relational processes when dealing strictly with the individual, nor is it possible to look at a personal in a relational world without giving any thought the individual herself. In the previous discussion of Gestalt therapy we saw the way in which relationship issues crept into a theory that is very much centered on the internal processes of the self.

Despite the fact that interpersonal and intra-personal approaches are often set up as very different from each other, it is clear that they are certainly aware of each other and cannot be entirely exclusive. The particular approach that is stressed for any given patient should be determined by that patient's own experiences, but it seems as though a balance can certainly be struck, in many cases, between the two.